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Human-Centered Civil Justice Design
Victor D. Quintanilla*
ABSTRACT

This Article introduces a novel approach to improving the civil
justice system, referred to as human-centered civil justice design. The
approach synthesizes insights and practices from two interdisciplinary
strands: human-centered design thinking and dispute system design. The
approach is rooted in human experiences with the processes, systems,
people, and environments that members of the public encounter when
navigating the civil justice system and how these experiences interact
with the entangled web of hardships and legal adversities they face in the
everyday.
Human-centered civil justice designers empathize with the intended
beneficiaries and stakeholders of the civil justice system, seeking to
deeply understand those served and to partner with these communities to
create innovative solutions stemming from people's actual needs,
Civil justice designers develop this
concerns, and experiences.
understanding by engaging in perspective-taking through immersion,
and, more generally, empirical and
interviews, observation,
They seek to understand stakeholders'
psychological inquiry.
before narrowing and identifying the civil
experiences
and
perspectives
justice problems to be solved. These designers ideate and brainstorm a
range of desirable human-centered solutions before winnowing them
down based on feasibility and financial viability.
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possible without the contributions of the research assistants in my IU Law & Social
Psychology Lab, including Alex Avtgis, Francesca Hoffmann, Gabrielle Koenig, Emily
Kile, Madeleine Schnittker, and Michael Yontz. Errors of thought and expression are
solely my own. I am incredibly grateful to my fellow travelers at the Center for
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ideas and their generosity.
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Human-centered civil justice design harnesses psychological and
behavioral science to understand how members of the public experience
the civil justice system and their encounters with legal officials. The
public's needs, aspirations, concerns, and experiences of justice are the
root of human-centered civil justice design.
Throughout this process, designers harness pilots to develop insight
from stakeholders on the causes, conditions, and nature of civil justice
problems.
These pilots are empirically tested with randomized
controlled trials (RCTs) to explore their system-wide effects before
interventions are adopted. The approach accommodates the reality of a
dynamic civil justice system that seeks to promote diverse process values
that are at times in tension, such as efficiency and promoting human
dignity.
After introducing human-centered civil justice design, the Article
applies this approach by first evaluating the design process by which the
2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of .Civil Procedure were
developed and then discussing implications for civil procedure
rulemaking and managerial judging.
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INTRODUCTION

A hospital in St. Louis invites a team of human-centered designers
to improve emergency rooms by capturing the patient experience.' One
of these designers puts himself in a patient's shoes and goes through the
emergency room process from admission to examination while videorecording the entire ordeal, developing an understanding of the
experience in a way no doctor, nurse, or hospital administrator could
possibly have explained.2 The team gains the perspective of a patient
encountering and navigating the emergency room and learns that, while
hospital administrators think of the emergency room in terms of
insurance verification, triaging, and efficiencies, patients experience the
process as a mix of fear, frustration, anger, boredom, and anxiety
provoked by an unfamiliar situation where one feels uninformed and
lost.3 The team concludes that the hospital can reconcile medical and

efficiency concerns with empathy for the patient perspective, insights
that ultimately yield an innovative program in which human-centered
designers work with the hospital to improve the patient experience.4
Another human-centered design team explores ways to
communicate the value of all forms of positive interaction with children
in the first five years of their lives5 to low-income families who often
6
have less access to advice on how to engage with babies and toddlers.
These designers immerse themselves in low-income communities,
interviewing parents and observing existing child-development
programs. By empathizing with parents, the team learns that, when
parenting advice is limited to encouraging parents to read books with
their children, many parents who are uncomfortable reading aloud forgo
engagement with their babies and toddlers.8 After extensive interviews
with parents, child-development experts, and pediatricians, the team
develops a campaign that celebrates everyday moments as learning
opportunities to connect and engage with children-learning
opportunities that strengthen the foundation of a child's brain
1.

This example is adapted from a story IDEO CEO Tim Brown recounts in TIM

BROWN & BARRY KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN: How DESIGN THINKING TRANSFORMS
ORGANIZATIONS AND INSPIRES INNOVATION 50-53 (2009) [hereinafter BROWN & KATZ,
CHANGE BY DESIGN].

2.
3.
4.
5.

See id at 51.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 52-53.
This example is adapted from an example discussed in IDEO.ORG, THE FIELD
TO HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN 71-73 (2015) [hereinafter IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO

GUIDE
HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN]
6. See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1,
7. See IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN,

8.

See id. at 73.

at 52-53.
supra note 5, at 71-73.
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development-and - materials that later form the foundation of a
successful public-health campaign based on the principle that "all parents
want to be good parents."9
Prior felony convictions for nonviolent offenses, like shoplifting
and simple drug possession, disqualify many low-income Americans
from housing, employment, and student aid.10 California allows people
with these convictions to convert them from felonies to misdemeanors,' 1
but the process is complex and often requires participants to seek the
help of a legal-aid provider or public defender. 12 Because of this, a
human-centered design team (Code for America) explores how to "help
the helpers."l 3 Closely collaborating with the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office, this Code for America team creates an online
platform that allows participants to complete the pre-screening process
online on their computers or mobile devices before meeting in-person
with a legal-aid provider.1 4 The human-centered design team builds a
"Clear My Record" tool, allowing legal-aid providers to reclassify
convictions more easily," which helps low-income Americans lift legal
restrictions that threaten their physical and mental well-being. 6
What these examples have in common is human-centered design
thinking, an approach that seeks to solve seemingly intractable social
problems with human-centered solutions.' 7 Originally harnessed to

9. See id. at 72.
10. See Michael Pinard, An IntegratedPerspective on the CollateralConsequences
of Criminal Convictions andReentry Issues Facedby FormerlyIncarceratedIndividuals,
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634-58 (2006); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender
Reentry and the CollateralConsequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 585, 590-605 (2006); Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving
While Black": Corollary Phenomenaand CollateralConsequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 717,
728-30 (1999); George Lipsitz, "In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty":
The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarcerationand Impediments to Women's Fair
Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1746, 1754-66 (2012).
11. See California Proposition 47, The Reduced Penalties for Some Crimes Initiative
(2014); Share My Story, MYPRoP47, http://myprop47.org/share-my-story/ (last visited
Mar. 19, 2017).
12. See Jazmyn Latimer et al., Public Defenders and LegalAid use ClearAy Record
to change non-violent criminal records, CODE FOR AMERICA,

https://www.code

foramerica.org/stories/public-defenders-and-legal-aid-use-technology-to-help-peoplechange-their-non-violent-criminal-records_(last updated May 19, 2016).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id
16. Seeid
17. See infra Part II, notes 150-236 and accompanying text; BROwN & KATZ,
CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 3-4; IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN-CENTERED

DESIGN, supra note 5, at 9-14; Paul Brest, Nadia Roumani & Jason Bade, Problem
Solving, Human-Centered Design, and Strategic Processes, STANFORD PACS (2015),
http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Download-the-full-article-
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create technological innovations, such as the Apple iPod, humancentered design is now being successfully applied to promote good
governance and a vibrant civil society, and to address challenges in areas
such as health, poverty, education, equality, and economic
development.' 8 The approach begins with the belief that all problems are
solvable and that the people who face these problems in everyday life
hold the key to solving them.19 Human-centered designers empathize
with stakeholder communities, seeking to deeply understand those served
and to partner with these stakeholder communities to create innovative
solutions rooted in people's actual needs, concerns, and experiences.20
Human-centered designers develop an understanding of these
experiences by engaging in perspective-taking through inunersion,
interviews, observation, and, more generally, empirical and
psychological inquiry. The aspiration of human-centered design thinking
is to advance the continued growth and improvement of institutions by
fostering the experiences of stakeholders in a desirable, feasible, and
viable way, thereby promoting human achievement and flourishing.
This Article introduces a novel approach to improving the civil
justice system, referred to as human-centeredcivil justice design.2 1 The
approach synthesizes insights and practices from two interdisciplinary
strands: human-centered design thinking and dispute system design.22
The approach is rooted in human experiences with the processes,
systems, people, and environments encountered when navigating the
civil justice system and how these experiences interact with the
entangled web of hardships and legal adversities people face in the
everyday. 23 To begin, human-centered civil justice designers empathize
and immerse themselves with intended beneficiaries and stakeholders
(e.g., parties, lawyers, judges, and members of the public) through
observation and interviews to uncover their needs and experiences,
embracing and identifying those needs in order to determine
stakeholders' interests and goals before narrowing and identifying the
problems to be solved. These designers ideate and brainstorm a range of

here.pdf; Tim Brown, Design Thinking, HARV. Bus. REv. (2008), https://hbr.org/2008/
06/ design-thinking.
18. See infra Part II, notes 151-237 and accompanying text; BROWN & KATZ,
CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 3-4; Brest et al., supra note 17, at 4.

19. See infra Part II, notes 151-237 and accompanying text; IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO
HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 9.
20. See infra Part II, notes 150-236 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part I.A. For a discussion of the human-centered design approach to
problem solving, see Brest et al., supra note 17.
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human-centered solutions before winnowing them down based on
feasibility and financial viability.
Throughout this process, designers harness pilots and prototypes to
develop insight from stakeholders regarding the causes, conditions, and
nature of civil justice problems. These pilots and prototypes are
empirically tested with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to explore
the system-wide effects of any proposed intervention. Human-centered
civil justice accommodates the reality of our dynamic civil justice system
and seeks to reconcile and promote diverse process values that are at
times in tension with each other, such as efficiency and promoting both
the opportunity to participate and human dignity.2 4
Further, human-centered civil justice designers draw from
psychological and behavioral science on how members of the public
experience the civil justice system and their encounters with court
officials, including psychological science on procedural justice and
distributive justice.
Justice researchers have demonstrated that
experiences of injustice erode the public's beliefs about the legitimacy of
the civil justice system, whereas experiences of justice foster beliefs
about legitimacy.25 Indeed, decades of research reveals that a sense of
justice powerfully influences .compliance with legal decrees, 26
cooperation with legal authorities, 27 and engagement in other prosocial, 28 participatory,29 and democratic behaviors.30 These plural effects
24. See infra Part I.A. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and
Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part I, 6 DUKE L.J. 1153,
1171-77(1974).
25. See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on
Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 379-80 (2006) [hereinafter,

Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy]; Kristina Murphy et al., Nurturing
Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When People Question the
Legitimacy of the Law? 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2-5 (2009).
26. See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 16169 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006).
27. See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., Betsy Stanko et al., A Golden Thread, a Presence
Amongst Uniforms, and a Good Deal of Data: Studying Public Confidence in the
London Metropolitan Police, 22 POLICING & Soc'Y 317, 318-20 (2012); Tom R. Tyler et
al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in CounterterrorismPolicing: A Study of Muslim
Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 365, 365-74 (2010).
28. See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., David De Cremer & Daan Van Knippenberg, How
do Leaders Promote Cooperation? The Effects of Charismaand ProceduralFairness,87
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858, 858-60 (2002).
29. See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, Managing
Group Behavior: The Interplay Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self and
Cooperation,37 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 151, 185-93 (2005).
30.

See infra Part I.C.2; see, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 61-172 (Melvin J. Lemer ed., Plenum Press 1988)
[hereinafter LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE]; Donna

Shestowsky, The Psychology of ProceduralPreference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal
ProceduresEx Ante, 99 IOWA L. REv. 637, 643-44 (2014).
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nourish a vibrant American democracy.31 The public's experiences of
justice are, therefore, central to human-centered civil justice design.
These designers also draw from research on how altering features of
rules, processes, and dispute resolution facilitates pro-social behavior,
cooperation, and intergroup harmony, thereby allowing humans to
achieve their full potential and to flourish.
After introducing the theory of human-centered civil justice design,
the Article applies this framework to consider both the rulemaking
process by which the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were designed and implications for managerial judging. 32
Unlike the three examples elaborated at the outset of the Article, the
problem-solving process that designed recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was not human-centered.3 3 Although lawyers
were surveyed for their general impressions of courts,34 members of the
public who navigate the federal civil justice system were not surveyed
Moreover, the highest-quality empirical
about their experiences.
evidence collected during the rulemaking process-case-specific data
collected by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)-revealed that many
lawyers' abstract impressions were divorced from the actual, concrete
evaluations of lawyers the FJC surveyed after litigating particular cases.
The causes, conditions, and nature of the problem ostensibly addressedcosts and delays in the federal civil justice system-were left ill-defined,
resulting in sweeping rule amendments proposed to solve vaguely
defined problems. These amendments were not empirically tested before
being proposed, let alone piloted or evaluated. 35 Despite the mainly
negative public comments offered during the notice and comment
process, the amendments were ultimately enacted.36 Unsurprisingly, the
rulemaking process has been sharply criticized.37 Scholars have called
for improvements to the civil justice design process to ensure that
rulemaking adequately addresses problems in the future. 38
In marked contrast to how these rules were designed, humancentered civil procedure rulemaking would seek to infuse the rulemaking

31.

See infra Part IC; see, e.g., Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy,

supra note 25, at 375-400 (reviewing psychological literature on legitimacy and
concluding that "the exercise of authority via fair procedures legitimates that authority,
and encourages voluntary deference").
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IA, notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part I.A, notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part I.A, notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part IA, notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part III.A, notes 276-308 and accompanying text.
38. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and
Litigation Reform: An InstitutionalApproach, 15 NEV. L. J. 1559, 1596 (2015).
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process with a vision in which diverse stakeholders and court users
experience the civil justice system as truly just.3 9 This Article discusses
three recommendations: 40 (1) stakeholder experiences of justice should
be systematically evaluated when cases close on the federal docket with
case-specific, online surveys; (2) civil justice designers should conduct
pilots and randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that examine the impact
of rule changes on stakeholder experiences of justice; and (3) given the
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, civil justice
designers should empirically evaluate how the interplay of amendments
affects diverse stakeholders and the public's experiences ofjustice.
After discussing the implications of human-centered civil justice
design on civil procedure rulemaking, the Article then turns to
managerial judging. In his 2015 year-end report, Chief Justice Roberts
applauded these amendments, which emphasize and enlarge the scope of
managerial judging by federal judges, 41 as marking "significant change
in the future conduct of civil litigation."42 He lauded a new legal culture
in which judges would serve as managerial judges who "place a premium
on prompt and efficient justice."4 3 The Chief Justice's call for a change
in legal culture may alter the beliefs, values, and discourses adopted by
managerial judges.4 4 In this regard, the Chief Justice's remarks reflect a
monist theory of value, exalting efficient justice while excluding more
capacious forms of justice-including procedural justice-and the other
plural process values that the civil justice system seeks to sustain.4 5
Troublingly, the Chief Justice exalted the value of efficiency-reducing
discovery costs and delays in civil justice-without regard to people's
actual experiences of justice.46

39. See infra Part III.B.
40. See infra Part III.A.
41. See infra Part I.B, notes 91-137 and accompanying text; Chief Justice Roberts,
2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME COURT 1, 9-10 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Year-End Report], http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2015year-endreport.pdf.
42. See infra Part II.B, notes 91-137 and accompanying text; 2015 Year-End Report,
supra note 41, at 5.
43. See 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 11; infra Part II.A, notes 66-90 and
accompanying text.
44. See infra Part III.B.
45. See infra Part IIB, notes 205-37 and accompanying text. See generally
Michelman, The Supreme Court and LitigationAccess Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights - PartI, supra note 24, at 1171-77 (elaborating on procedural values, including
deterrence values, effectuation values, and dignity and participation values).
46. See infra Part II.B; 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 6-7, 11 ("The
amendments ... identify techniques to expedite resolution of pretrial discovery disputes,
including conferences with the judge before filing formal motions in aid of discovery.
Such conferences can often obviate the need for a formal motion-a well-timed scowl
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Human-centered managerial judging, however, would encourage
federal judges to infuse their managerial practices with considerations of
procedural justice to promote favorable experiences. An important
criterion of human-centered managerial judging is the degree to which
the public experiences their interactions with judges and case
management as infused with fairness, justness, and legitimacy.
Achieving this aim will require developing new and skillful means to
foster these salutatory experiences, including training in perspective
taking, compassion, and openness to the perspectives of the parties who
come before the court. By promoting experiences of justice, humancentered managerial judging not only advances the aims that the federal
civil justice system already seeks to achieve, but it also reconciles
tension between values of efficient justice and procedural justice, rather
than wishing away such tension.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces
the theme of human-centered civil justice design and presents
psychological research on experiences of justice, including procedural
justice and distributive justice. Part II discusses the rulemaking process
of the 2015 amendments and the Chief Justice's year-end report. Part III
discusses the implications of this research and human-centered civil
justice design on the rulemaking process and managerial judging.
I.

TOWARD HUMAN-CENTERED CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGN

Over the past decade, two powerful approaches to innovating and
designing effective institutions have emerged: human-centered design4 7
and dispute system design.48 When woven together, these approaches
offer a novel way forward for solving vexing problems and challenges
within the civil justice system. This Article refers to the synthesis of
these two approaches as human-centeredciviljustice design.4 9
While a human-centered approach to civil justice design is novel,
human-centered approaches in general have been lauded and adopted in
Human-centered design has roots in the humanistic
other fields.
from a trial judge can go a long way in moving things along crisply.") (emphasis added);
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (Russell Sage Found. 1979).
47. See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 39-62; IDEO, FIELD
GUIDE TO HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 9-14; Brest et al., supra note 17, at
2-5; Brown, supra note 17, at 86-92; STEVE HILTON ET AL., MORE HUMAN: DESIGNING A
WORLD WHERE PEOPLE COME FIRST 1-41 (PublicAffairs 2016).
48.

H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING

See NANCY

SYSTEMS

AND PROCESSES FOR

MANAGING DISPUTES (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2013); LISA BLOMGREN AMSLER,
JANET

MARTINEZ

&

STEPHANIE

SMITH,

DISPUTE

SYSTEM

DESIGN:

PREVENTING,

MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (Stanford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2016).

49.
design.

I refer to the synthesis of these two approaches as human-centered civil justice
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psychology movement of the mid-twentieth century,o with Abraham
Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Rollo May among the most influential
founding theorists.51 Humanistic psychology 52 moved psychology from
the era of traditional Freudian psychotherapy and behaviorism to clientcentered therapy. 53 Traditional psychotherapy, which client-centered
therapists view as "coercive, manipulative, authoritarian, and
inefficient," assumes that the therapist is "superior" to the patient and has
more of a role in the patient's development than the patient himself,
while client-centered therapy reflects that "the center of the therapeutic
Client-centered therapists
process must reside in the client. "4
"embrace[] a philosophy of respect for, and partnership with, people
receiving services."5 5 The founders of these client-centered approaches
also believed that the behaviorism prevalent in the early twentieth
century (advanced by John Watson and B.F. Skinner) stemmed from a
diminished and reductionist model of human nature.5 6 Maslow and
Rogers (among other humanistic theorists) emphasized a holistic or
multilayered understanding of psychological phenomena and searched
for the necessary and sufficient conditions that enabled humans to grow,
self-actualize, seek fulfillment, and reach the highest levels of human
functioning. 7
This human-centered approach has since taken root in disciplines
other than psychology, including education, medicine, and business. The
to education
approach
student-centered
or learner-centered
"acknowledges that the success of education depends on how much a
student is learning, and it acknowledges that the teacher's success

50.

See Donald Moss, The Roots and Genealogy ofHumanisticPsychology, in KIRK

J. SCHNEIDER, J. FRASER PIERSON & JAMES F.T. BUGENTAL, THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Kirk J. Schneider et al.

eds., 2015); see, e.g., Frances K. Stage et al., Creating Learner-CenteredClassrooms:
What Does Learning Theory Have To Say?, in 26(4) ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUC. REP. 35
(Jonathan D. Fife ed., 1998) (tracing the development of the student-centered approach in
education to the development of humanistic psychology).
A Study of
51. See, e.g., Abraham H. Maslow, Self-actualizing People:
Psychological Health, in DOMINANCE, SELF-ESTEEM, SELF-ACTUALIZATION: GERMINAL
PAPERS OF A.H. MASLOW (R. J. Lowry ed., 1973); CARL ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED
THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICES, IMPLICATIONS, AND THEORY (1951); ROLLO MAY,
ERNEST ANGEL & HENRI F. ELLENBERGER, EXISTENCE: A NEW DIMENSION IN PSYCHIATRY
AND PSYCHOLOGY (1958); FREDERICK S. PERLS, EGO, HUNGER, AND AGGRESSION (1969).

52.

See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 51.

53. See ANTHONY BARTON, THREE WORLDS OF THERAPY: AN EXISTENTIALPHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE THERAPIES OF FREUD, JUNG, AND ROGERS 177 (1974).

54.

Id.

55.

MARY C. LAW, CLIENT-CENTERED OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 3 (SLACK 1998).

56.

See JOHN B. WATSON,

BEHAVIORISM (People's Inst. 1924); B.F. SKINNER,

BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971).

57.

See Moss, supra note 50, at 13.

2017]

HUMAN-CENTERED C1VIL JUSTICE DESIGN

755

depends on how well the . . teaching style and the student's learning
style fit.""
Patient-centered medicine aims "to integrate the
conventional understanding of disease with each patient's unique
experience of illness,"S9 as contrasted with a traditional disease- or
physician-centered approach, by which "physicians ascertain the
patient's complaints . . . within

their

own frame of reference." 60

Similarly, human-centered design in the business context may be referred
to as "empathic" design, 6 1 "participatory" design 62 or "user-centered"
design. 63 Human-centered design in this context involves "all people
potentially affected by a design," such as a new product or system, in
order to arrive at the best final design, as contrasted with a traditional
design approach that prioritizes the designers' expertise above the
experiences of the end-user.6 4 Finally, in the legal context, attributes of
this human-centered approach can be found in client-centered
lawyering.65

58.

Stage et al., supra note 50, at ix.

Prominent student-centered educational

theorists include Albert Bandura who developed a theory of self-efficacy. See generally
Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 84
PSYCHOL. REV. 191 (1977); Albert Bandura, Perceived Self-Efficacy in Cognitive
Development and Functioning,28 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 117 (1993). Jean Piaget and his
theory of social constructivism. See generally JEAN PIAGET, SCIENCE OF EDUCATION AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD (1970); JEAN PIAGET, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE
(1951); JEAN PIAGET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD (1954). Lev

Vygotsky and his theory of social constructivism. See generally LEV VYGOTSKY,
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962).
Howard Gardner and his theory of multiple
intelligences. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF
MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1983); Howard Gardner & Thomas Hatch, Multiple
Intelligences Go to School: Educational Implications of the Theory of Multiple
Intelligences, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 4 (1989).
59. MOIRA STEWART ET AL., PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICINE: TRANSFORMING THE
CLINICAL METHOD 23 (SAGE Publications, Inc., 1995); see also Joseph B. Levenstein et
al., The Patient-CentredClinicalMethod: A Modelfor the Doctor-PatientInteraction in
Family Medicine, 3 FAMILY PRACTICE 24, 25 (1986); JH Levenstein, The PatientCenteredGeneralPractice Consultation, 5 S. AFR. FAM. PRAC. 276, 278 (1984).
60. STEWART ET AL., supra note 59, at 24.
61. See, e.g., Dorothy Leonard & Jeffrey F. Rayport, Spark Innovation Through
Empathic Design, HARV. BUS. REV. 102 (1997), https://hbr.org/1997/11/sparkinnovation-through-empathic-design.
62. See generally Yoram Reich et al., Varieties and Issues of Participationand
Design, 17 DESIGN STUD. 165 (1996).
63. See generally Shana Smith et al., A KE-LSA Approach for User-Centered
Design, 24 J. INTELLIGENT MANUFACTURING 919 (2013).
64. Reich et al., supra note 62, at 165-66.
65. See generally Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal
and Refinement, 32 ARIZ L. REv. 501 (1990); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand:
The PluralValues of Client-CenteredRepresentation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
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Developing Human-CenteredCivil Justice Design

A.

This section turns first to human-centered design thinking, then to
dispute system design, and last synthesizes these two frameworks into an
approach referred to as human-centered civil justice design.
1.

Human-Centered Design Thinking

Human-centered design thinking provides a framework for
designing with communities affected by problems, allowing designers to
deeply understand the people that they seek to serve when creating
solutions stemming from the community's needs. 6 The approach is
bottom-up, rather than top-down, and begins with the premise that the
people who confront problems are the ones who hold the key to
answering them. 67 Designers closely observe how people behave; how
features and cues within environments affect thoughts, emotions, and
behaviors (i.e., psychological experiences); and the meaning people
make from the environments and the processes they encounter.
The approach integrates and reconciles three overlapping criteria:
desirability (i.e., what meets stakeholders' needs and aspirations),
feasibility (i.e., what is technologically possible within the foreseeable
future), and viability (i.e., what is financially sustainable).6 8 The
approach begins with humans-their needs, aims, and fears-and
uncovers what is desirable, imbuing innovation and problem-solving
with a human-centered ethos. The approach requires a thorough
empirical understanding, through direct observation, of what people need
in their lives and what they like or dislike about particular practices and
institutions.69 Human-centered design seeks to create a range of options

66. See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 39-40; IDEO, FIELD
GUIDE TO HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 9; Brest et al., supra note 17, at 3;
Brown, supra note 17, at 86.
67.

See,

e.g.,

MARGARET

GERTEIS

ET AL.,

THROUGH

THE PATIENT's

EYES:

UNDERSTANDING AND PROMOTING PATIENT-CENTERED CARE 5 (1993) (describing patient-

centered medicine as "an approach that consciously adopts the patient's perspective");
Stage et al., supra note 50, at 35 (describing Jean Piaget's social constructivist approach
to education as "student-centered" because it emphasizes that teachers must involve
students in the process of learning so that students can "construct their own meanings");
BARTON, supra note 53, at 177 (describing client-centered therapy as an approach that
assumes that "the center of the therapeutic process must reside in the client").
68. See BROwN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 18; IDEO, FIELD
GUIDE TO HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 13-14.
69. See BROwN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 43-44; IDEO, FIELD
GUIDE TO HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 22. For example, empathic user-

centered design in business has helped companies determine customer needs, sometimes
before a customer is even able to articulate what his or her need is, through processes of
observation and prototyping. See Leonard & Rayport, supra note 61, at 104-06.
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that are technologically feasible in meeting human needs 70 and examines
feasible alternatives for solutions that are financially viable.7
Figure 1: Human-Centered Design Thinking

Desirability
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Human-centered design thinking moves through three overlapping
noinspiration, ideation, and
spaces when designing an intervention:
implementation.72 Inspiration is the opportunity that motivates the search
for solutions.C
The inspiration stage entails identifying key
beneficiaries and stakeholders (i.e., people and institutions that
contribute to problems or solutions) and learning their experiences
through direct observation, ethnography, surveys, psychological studides,

and other forms of perspective-taking.7

After designers identify

70.

See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE By DESIGN, supra note 1, at 18-19;

7 1.

Id. at 18-19.

72. These are overlapping spaces rather than sequential stages of a lockstep
methodology. See id. at 64. The reason for the iterative, nonlinear nature is that design
thinking is fundamentally an exploratory process; it will invariably make unexpected
discoveries. See Brest et al., supra note 17, at 26.
73. See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE By DESIGN, supra note 1, at 16 ; IDEO, FIELD
GUIDE To HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 29.

74. See, e.g., Leonard & Rayport, supra note 61, at 104 (describing empathic usercentered design as a process that involves "gathering, analyzing, and applying
information

gleaned

from observation

in

the field");

FRANK

R. RITTER ET AL.,
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stakeholders, they narrow the number of needs the specific project will
address. Next, in the ideation stage, designers translate these insights
and generate, develop, and test ideas, always considering the criteria of
desirability, feasibility, and viability.75 Finally, in the implementation
stage, designers develop the best ideas into a concrete plan of action.
Throughout this process, designers engage in prototyping with
scaled-down, less expensive, and adjustable versions of the solution.
Prototyping early may inspire new ideas and give designers new insights
from beneficiaries. When brainstorming solutions, prototyping refines
ideas to ensure that they are desirable, feasible, and viable. Pilots help
test aspects of solutions and assumptions. These potential interventions
may be tested in RCTs before full-scale adoption. At the implementation
stage, pilots will be more complete, expensive, and complex-potentially
indistinguishable from the final intervention. Designers continually and
systematically evaluate how these interventions perform.
This
technique accords with intuitions about best practices in problem
solving: carefully defining and understanding the problem to be solved,
designing solutions to solve the problem, evaluating the solutions before
adoption, implementing a solution, and observing and learning from any
proposed intervention.
2.

Dispute System Design

Dispute system design, the applied art and science of designing the
means to prevent, manage, learn from, and resolve streams of conflict,77

offers important lessons. First, dispute system designers should aim to
design a dispute resolution system that is fair and just while also
considering the efficiencies of the system for the institution and
participants. Dispute system design recognizes that there are important,
albeit at times divergent, process values to reconcile and balance.
Second, dispute system design seeks to engage all stakeholders,
including participants, when designing and implementing a dispute
FOUNDATIONS FOR DESIGNING USER-CENTERED SYSTEMS:

NEED TO KNow ABOUT PEOPLE

WHAT SYSTEMS DESIGNERS

4 (2014) (advocating a theory of systems design that

includes "[r]eflection and experimentation with potential users of the system . .
throughout the design and development process").
75. BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 16; IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO
HUMAN CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 75.
76. For example, a hallmark of student-centered education is that it is "dynamic" and
"responsive." STUDENT-CENTERED LEARNING: NINE CLASSROOMS IN ACTION 188 (Bill
Nave ed. 2015) ("Student-centered teaching is not relying on a script; rather, it is
incorporating the underpinnings of good teaching in a multitude of lessons that may be
swapped out, modified, built upon, and even scrapped at the last moment. It is making
changes in response to feedback, assessment, and instinct.").
77. See AMSLER ET AL., supra note 48, 1-17.
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system. Third, the system should both consider and seek prevention of
disputes and include multiple and appropriate rights-based and interestbased process options. Fourth, a dispute system should ensure flexibility
and choice in the sequence-of-process options accessible and match the
design with the available resources.78 Finally, such systems should be
accountable, transparent, and capable of evaluation. Dispute system
design proceeds through several stages: first, taking design initiative;
second, assessing the current situation; third, formulating a dispute
system; fourth, implementing the design; and fifth, evaluating and
revising the design. 7 9 These lessons have been applied in the context of
internal grievance systems within business organizations, though more
recently dispute system design has been applied to develop courtannexed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures.80
3.

Human-Centered Civil Justice Design

Human-centered civil justice design synthesizes these two
approaches into a powerful framework to improve our civil justice
system. It aspires to promote a civil justice system that is experienced by
the public as "just, speedy, and inexpensive" 81 and to prevent "wicked
problems," including unintended consequences stemming from illcrafted system design changes.82 Civil justice designers realize these
aspirations by harnessing the best practices of human-centered design
and dispute system design. These best practices include: (1) uncovering

78. See id.
79. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 48, at 16; AMSLER ET AL., supra note 48, Chapter
4 "System Design Practice."
80. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, What We Know and Need to Know About
Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REv. 245, 247 (2015) ("The second
generation of ADR research should focus not on whether courts should use ADR but on
how mediation and other ADR processes should be conducted. Which ADR program
characteristics and mediator interventions are correlated with the positive results for the
parties and judiciary? How do different demographic groups fare in mediation as
compared to trial?") (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Lorig Charkoudian, Impact of
Alternative Dispute Resolution on Responsibility, Empowerment, Resolution and
Satisfaction with the Judiciary: Comparisonof Self-Reported Outcomes in District Court
Civil Cases, STATE JUSTICE INST. 1 (2014), http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/pdfs/
see MD. ADR RESEARCH,
reports/impactadrondistrictctcivilcases20l4report.pdf;
Statewide Evaluation ofADR in Maryland: Articles and Publications, http://www.mary
landadrresearch.org /publications (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
81. FED. R. CIv.P. 1.
82. See Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL'Y ScI. 155, 161 (1973) ("[Y]ou may agree that it becomes morally
objectionable for the planner to treat a wicked problem as though it were a tame one, or
to tame a wicked problem prematurely, or to refuse to recognize the inherent wickedness
of social problems."); Richard Buchanan, Wicked Problems in .Design Thinking, 8
DESIGN ISSUES 5, 15-16 (1992).

760

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:3

the public's varied needs, goals, and concerns to identify the causes,
conditions, and nature of problems and the extent to which the existing
civil justice system departs from the public's needs and aspirations; and
(2) iterating and conducting pilots of proposed civil justice interventions
before formally redesigning the civil justice system.
First, in the inspirationstage, human-centered civil justice designers
would seek to empathize with the many beneficiaries and stakeholders of
the civil justice system, conferring on them standing, dignity, and respect
by ensuring that their needs, goals, and concerns are heard and
considered.83 These beneficiaries and stakeholders include parties,
lawyers, judges, court administrators, and members of the public.84 In
examining the way in which people experience justice as well as the
justiciable hardships people face, civil justice designers would uncover
the needs, concerns, and goals of stakeholders (which may conflict), as
well as the meaning people make of experiences in the civil justice
system.85 This understanding may be collected through observation,
83. This approach has been successful in the medical context. A traditional patientcentered model of treatment consists of six interconnected components that make doctors
partners with their patients in diagnosis and treatment: (1) exploring both the disease and
illness experience; (2) understanding the whole person; (3) finding common ground
regarding management; (4) incorporating prevention and health promotion; (5) enhancing
the patient-doctor relationship; and (6) being realistic. STEWART ET AL., supra note 59, at
25. For example, a doctor who practices patient-centered care will involve patients in the
decisionmaking process, make sure patients feel fully informed, treat patients' physical
discomfort, and provide emotional support. GERTEIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 5-11.
Studies suggest that there is a relationship between patient-centered care and positive
patient outcomes, which may also be related to a patient's (1) trust; (2) "adherence to
recommended treatment"; and (3) "continuity with health care providers." Mark Meterko
et al., Mortality Among Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction: The Influences of
Patient-CenteredCare and Evidence-Based Medicine, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1188,
1189 (2010).
84. Each of these populations will have different perspectives that will cast light
when learning the needs and concerns of the public and the way in which our civil justice
design is experienced. Amartya Sen has reasoned about the importance of including the
"impartial spectator," when addressing justice dilemmas, which in this context I take as
including impartial, non-party members of the public who may have previously or who
may in the future encounter and navigate the civil justice system. See AMARTYA K. SEN,
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 44-46 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009).
85. One way in which we come to know the idea of justice is by observing justice
and injustice in the world around us. See Aristotle, Physics, in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 259, 259 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("When the objects of an inquiry, in
any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with
those that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained."); see also John
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 93, 121 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("All ideas come from sensation or
reflection."); George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 401, 413 ("[T]he existence of
an idea consists in being perceived."); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in 35
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 449, 457 ("When we entertain, therefore, any
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interviews, surveys, focus groups, deep immersion within communities,
6
and psychological and behavioral studies of stakeholder experiences.
Next, in the ideating stage, human-centered civil justice designers
would involve stakeholders at multiple points in the design process,
including brainstorming, evaluating, and piloting. This pluralism allows
diverse perspectives to emerge and ensures that any civil justice
intervention is balanced among the many process values promoted by the
civil justice system. Finally, human-centered civil justice design would
be optimistic and humble, creating pilots in the implementation stage and
testing these interventions with RCTs before integrating civil justice
interventions more broadly.
By engaging in this iterative, bottom-up, pluralistic, and incremental
process, human-centered civil justice designers can better avoid the
wicked system problems and unintended consequences that befall less
reflective design processes. RCTs offer an important benefit for civil
justice designers who seek to isolate the causal effects of their system
design interventions-and the mechanisms that undergird these effects.
In this regard, piloting and the implementation of incremental design
changes with RCTs would reveal whether interventions truly address
human needs and aspirations-examining gaps between law in the books
and law in action 8 7-without unintentionally creating wicked system
problems that diminish experiences of justice, unreasonably increase
88
costs or delays, or frustrate access to justice.
suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but
too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?
And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.").
86. This approach can help design teams define and understand problems in a way
that the beneficiaries and stakeholders may not be able to articulate. For example, in the
business context, a consulting group observed consumers who carried both cell phones
and beepers and realized that the consumers were using the combination as a way to
screen calls-they would give special beeper codes to people whose calls they wanted to
screen. From that observation, the. consultants were able to realize a consumer "need for
filtering capabilities on cell phones." Leonard & Rayport, supra note 61, at 106.
87. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 15
(1910); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431, 457-59 (1930). . This process of piloting and revising is crucial to any studentcentered or learner-centered approach in education, for example. Because a studentcentered approach seeks to tailor educational processes based on empirical and
theoretical knowledge of students' cognitive development and individual learning styles,
student-centered educators must open themselves up to feedback from students and must
be willing to adjust their processes when they realize that their pedagogical techniques
are not working for students. STUDENT-CENTERED LEARNING: NINE CLASSROOMS IN
ACTION, supra note 76, at 186-88.
88. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 82, at 162 ("With wicked problems, ... any
solution, after being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an
Moreover, the next day's
extended-virtually an unbounded-period of time.
consequences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh
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The goal of human-centered civil justice design is to guide in the
ceaseless, compassionate evolution of a civil justice system that benefits
humanity. It applies psychological and behavioral research on human
needs, limitations, capabilities, and potential in the design of the civil
justice system.8 9 The approach focuses on human beings, their
interactions with one another within the civil justice system, their
experiences with the processes, systems, and environments they
encounter when navigating the civil justice system, and how these
experiences interact with the entangled web of hardships and legal
adversities they face in the everyday. Civil justice designers investigate
how humans respond to features of the civil justice system in particular
contexts.90 This information serves as the basis for predicting the
probable effects of design alternatives and proposing system design
recommendations. Civil justice designers also harness pilots and RCTs
to test and incrementally apply design recommendations. When pilots
and RCTs reveal the causal effects of a design change, an innovation
may be more broadly adopted. Civil justice designers monitor and
evaluate the influence of improvements to ensure the intended aims and
benefits manifest in particular contexts. Given that the civil justice
system is dynamic, prior interventions may reveal the need for
subsequent interventions. In this way, human-centered civil justice
design is a ceaseless process that facilitates experiences of justice and
addresses legal needs that interact with social, financial, and
environmental circumstances to threaten human, well-being.
This
ceaseless process of design promotes human flourishing and nourishes
democratic institutions.
Human-centered civil justice design incorporates psychological
science on experiences of justice, a theme to which the Article now turns.

the intended advantages or the advantages accomplished hitherto. In such cases, one
would have been better off if the plan had never been carried out.").
89. In this way, human-centered civil justice design shares much in common with
the human factors approach in engineering and design. See generally MARK S. SANDERS
& ERNEST J. MCCORMICK, HUMAN FACTORS IN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN (7th ed.,

McGraw-Hill 1993).
90. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931) ("The belief in the worthwhileness of grouping
cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been the practices in the past.
This is connected with the distrust of verbally simple rules-which so often cover
dissimilar and non-simple fact situations.").
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PsychologicalScience on Experiences ofJustice

As a desire for justice is a fundamental human need, 91 psychological
science and behavioral research on how humans experience justice drives
human-centered civil justice design and complements the humanistic
tradition of studying philosophies of justice. Whereas philosophies of
justice contemplate societal justice from a normative perspective, as
exemplified by the luminous philosophies of Plato and Aristotle at the
dawn of Western civilization, 92 psychological research examines the
subjective experiences of humans affected in the everyday by situations,
contexts, and institutions. The psychological study of justice examines
questions such as: (1) What do people consider just and unjust, why,
where, when, and under what conditions? (2) What are the consequences
of experienced justice and injustice? (3) How do people, groups,
societies, and cultures differ from one another on these dimensions? (4)
How do justice conflicts arise and amplify between groups, and how can
these conflicts be peacefully resolved? 9 3 The Article now turns to a
review of psychological science that reveals how humans experience
procedural justice and distributive justice.
1.

Procedural Justice

Psychological research on procedural justice examines how people
experience fairness, including how they experience procedural rules and
treatment by legal officials.94 Over the past several decades, researchers
have demonstrated that experiences of procedural justice influence not
only satisfaction with how disputes are handled, but also the degree to

91.

See John E. Ellard, Annelie Harvey & Mitchell J. Callan, The Justice Motive:

History, Theory, and Research, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THEORY AND RESEARCH

127, 127 (Clara Sabbach & Manfred Schmitt eds., 2016); Leo Montada & Jurgen Maes,
Justice and Self Interest, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THEORY AND RESEARCH,

supra, at 109.
92. See generally Plato, The Republic "Books I-V", in 7 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 295 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 339, 377 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("[W]e call
those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the
political society.").
93. See Mario Gollwitzer & Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Psychology of Justice, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THEORY AND Research, supra note 91, at 61, 61.
94. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 65-69 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001);
see generally LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note

30 (synthesizing research on procedural justice).
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which the public views legal officials as legitimate and accepts and
adheres to legal decisions.95
Procedural justice researchers have investigated civil processes in
an effort to enhance the public's experiences within the civil justice
system and to improve compliance with judicial decrees. For example,
researchers have examined the public's perception of different civil legal
procedures-trial, mediation, arbitration, and negotiation-and have
investigated the extent to which litigants experience them as fair and
accept the substantive decisions derived from these legal procedures. 96
This research has consistently revealed that procedural justice influences
people's impressions of fairness as strongly-if not more so-as
substantive outcomes.9 7 While the public desires favorable outcomes,
the public also demands fair procedures and fair treatment.
a.

Antecedents of Procedural Justice

Researchers have elaborated several theories on why, and the
conditions under which, procedural justice powerfully affects people's
thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
The relationalmodel of authority and the group-value model posit
that people care about their relationships and standing with authorities
and groups who make decisions that affect them. 99 Dignified and
respectful treatment by authorities affects feelings of standing, selfworth, and beliefs about one's social identity and whether the social
groups to which one belongs are valued. Procedural justice, therefore,
has intrapersonal psychological implications for feelings of inclusion in
or alienation from society. This research also reveals interpersonal and
95. See Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 103, 128 (1988)
[hereinafter Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?].
96. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases:
What We Know From EmpiricalResearch, 17 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 644-73
(2002); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS
Redress Program: Observations ofADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399,

405-25 (2001); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice in
the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 149-61 (2011); Donna Shestowsky,
ProceduralPreferencesin Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an
Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211, 211-49 (2004); Rebecca HollanderBlumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness,
Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 473, 477-79

(2008).
97. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, at 71.
98. See Kees Van den Bos, What is Responsible for the Fair Process Effect?, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 273, 273-300 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A.

Colquitt eds., 2005); Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice, supra
note 96, at 132.
99. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, at 75-77.
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intergroup psychological consequences of fair treatment: fair treatment
communicates whether authorities regard social groups as members who
truly belong in a community. Finally, the relational model of authority
and the group-value model connect with the normative and philosophical
position that promoting human dignity and respect is an important end of
social institutions, including our civil justice system. As such, research
on procedural justice can be harnessed to advance human dignity as well
as respectful and cooperative interactions between individuals and
groups within society, and to nourish our democratic institutions and
norms.
Secondly, fairness heuristic theory connects uncertainty
management with fairness. This theory posits that, especially under
conditions of uncertainty where there is a risk of exploitation, people rely
upon their evaluations about the fairness of procedures to understand the
100
trustworthiness of decision-makers and the fairness of outcomes.
Evaluations about the fairness of procedures help people manage and
resolve uncertainty, operating much like heuristics. 101 Relatedly, the
uncertainty hypothesis' 02 predicts that conditions of uncertainty
strengthen the fair-process effect. When people are unable to compare
their results with the results of others, they feel an even more pronounced
influence of procedural justice. 103
Finally, the moral-mandates model posits that people use deeply
held ethical and moral principles when gauging the justness of
procedures and treatment.1 04 For example, people believe that decision05 A
makers have a moral obligation to act justly, morally, and ethically.

100. See Kees van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of
Fairness Judgments, in 34 ADVANCES INEXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 21-34
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002).
101. Seeid
102. See Kees Van den Bos, UncertaintyManagement: The Influence of Uncertainty
Salience on Reactions to Perceived Procedural Fairness, 80 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 931, 931-41 (2001).
103. See Kees Van den Bos, E. Allan Lind, Riel Vermunt & Henk A.M. Wilke, How
Do I Judge My Outcome When I Don't Know the Outcome of Others?: The Psychology
of the FairProcessEffect, 5 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1035 (1997).

104. See Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process is of No
Consequence: Moral Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 Soc.
JUST. RES. 305, 308-09 (2001); Kjell Tornblom and Riel Vermunt, Towards Integrating
DistributiveJustice, ProceduralJustice, and Social Resource Theories, 20 Soc. JUST.
RES. 312, 317-18 (2007); Russell Cropanzano, Barry Goldman & Robert Folger, Deontic
Justice: The Role of Moral Principles in Workplace Fairness, 24 J. ORGAN. BEHAV.
1019, 1019-23 (2003).
105. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, at 75-76; Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be
Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social
Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27, (Kenneth

J. Gergen, Martin S. Greenberg & Ronald G. Wells eds., 1980).
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sharp discrepancy between one's own moral or ethical standards and a
decision-maker's behavior may violate a moral mandate and lead to
outrage and other negative experiences. 106
b.

Attributes of Procedural Justice

Over the past decade, psychological research has illuminated
several attributes that shape evaluations of procedural justice, 10 7
including procedural-fairness and treatment-fairness (or interactional
justice) dimensions, attributes to which the Article now turns.
Experiences of procedural justice are shaped by whether parties are
afforded a voice and an opportunity to be heard, whether they are
afforded a neutral and trustworthy decision maker, and whether they are
treated with dignity. 0 8 As a conceptual matter, these features form a
"positively interrelated cluster of procedural criteria,"1 09 that are
independent but can be advanced simultaneously.
John Thibaut and Laurens Walker first articulated the importance of
voice.110 Allowing disputants to voice their perspectives improves
evaluations about the fairness of proceedings."' In the four decades
106. See Skitka & Houston, supra note 104, at 323-324; Tornblom & Vermunt, supra
note 104, at 318; Cropanzano et al., supra note 104, at 1019.
107. See Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?, supra note 95, at 128.
108. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, 74-81; Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 96, at
138-46; Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural
Justice: Defining the Meaning of a FairProcess, 29 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 747, 747-49 (2003); see generally ToM R.TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE
LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002)
(describing attributes of procedural justice).
109. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?, supra note 95, at 131.
110. See Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participantsand Observers to Modes of
Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 295, 295-310 (1974).
111. These attributes. of procedural justice have a long and hallowed history in
Western thought. For example, Aeschylus, the Greek poet born around year 525 B.C., in
Eumenides narrates a discussion between Goddess Athena and the Chorus of Furies, in
which the Furies aim to deprive Orestes of voice at his trial before the judges of Delphi.
To which, Athena sharply replies:
Ye would seem just, yet work iniquity... Furies: How? Tell me that! Thou
art not poor in wisdom. Athena: Wrong shall not triumph here by force of
oaths. Furies: Question him then and give a righteous judgment . . Athena:
Sir, what has thou to answer touching this? Tell me thy land, thy lineage and
all Thy griefs; and then speak in thine own defence, If that thou look'st for
judgment; for that cause Harbourest at my hearth; all rites performed, A grave
appellant, like Ixion old. Come, to all this make me your clear reply.
Aeschylus, Eumenides, in 5 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 81, 85-86 (W. D.
Ross trans., 1952) (emphasis added). Similarly, Euripides, the Greek poet born around
year 480 B.C., in Hippolytus, narrates a tragic sequence after King Theseus rashly asks
Poseidon to curse death on his beloved son Hippolytus without first offering Hippolytus
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since, this "voice effect" has been well documented. When people feel
that they have been permitted to fully and fairly discuss their situations,
even when there is little chance of influencing the final outcome, they are
more likely to feel that an ultimate decision is fair.
Some have cautioned that this phenomenon can be manipulated to
result in empty trappings of fairness: a legal official might purport to
listen while having no intention of considering a disputant's
perspective.1 12 While research suggests that the "voice effect" turns on
the degree to which the public believes that a legal official will
meaningfully consider the voices and views presented, this double-edged
sword of procedural justice remains.113 Experiences of fairness are also
influenced by the opportunity to present one's case. In several studies,
the extent to which disputants believed that they had an opportunity to
present their case significantly predicted their experience of procedural
justice after decisions were made.114
Neutrality also influences experiences of procedural justice.115
Perceptions of neutrality are shaped by whether judges act honestly and
in an unbiased manner and derive decisions from facts and evidence in a
consistent manner.116 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff has described the
attribute of neutrality as requiring honest, impartial, and objective judges
who actively prevent their own personal biases and values from skewing
their decisions. Relatedly, trustworthiness is engendered when legal
officials are truly motivated to be fair to members of the public and
others in one's social group.117 In short, whether the public experiences

procedural justice to defend himself against false charges, to which Goddess Artemis
warns, "But thou alike in [Poseidon's] eyes and in mine hast shewn thy evil heart, in that
thou hastforestalledall proofor voice prophetic, has made no inquiry, nor taken timefor
consideration, but with undue haste cursed thy son even to the death." Euripides,
Hippolytus, in 5 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, supra, 225, 235 (emphasis
added).
112. See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged
Sword of ProceduralFairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. 171, 188-93 (2005); Ronald
L. Cohen, ProceduralJustice and Participation,38 HUM. REL. 643, 643-63 (1985).
113. See David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, The Effects of Trust in Authority and
ProceduralFairnesson Cooperation, 92 PSYCHOL. Sci. 639, 639-49 (2007); MacCoun,
supra note 112, at 192-93.
114. See Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?, supra note 95, at 121.
115.

See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism,in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 445,

466 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("A tribunal, for example, must be impartial, because it is
bound to award, without regard to any other consideration, a disputed object to the one of
two parties who has the right to it.").
116. See Tyler & Lind, supranote 94, at 75-76.
117. See id.at 76.
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civil justice as just turns, in part, on the perceived neutrality and
trustworthiness of legal officials.' 18
Moreover, experiences of procedural justice are strongly shaped by
whether legal officials treat members of the public with dignity and
respect.119 Respectful and dignified treatment sends a powerful signal
about one's status as an equal and participating member of the
community with standing, which in turn imbues trust in legal officials
and results in voluntary compliance with law. 12 0 These psychological
processes mutually reinforce one another and lead to a virtuous cycle of
cooperation between legal officials and members of the public.
Turning to a related conceptual framework, Gerald Leventhal has
advanced a model of procedural justice with six criteria, including
consistency,
bias
suppression,
accuracy,
correctability,
representativeness, and ethicality. 12 1
With regard to consistency,
procedures should be applied consistently across persons and over time.
As to bias suppression, the personal self-interest, biases, and
preconceptions of decision-makers should not influence how disputes are
resolved. With regard to accuracy, decisions should be based on
accurate information.
Correctability implies the existence of
opportunities to seek decision modifications, including the right to
appeal. As to representativeness, the concerns and values of all
important stakeholders and groups affected by a decision should be
reflected in the dispute resolution process. Finally, with regard to
ethicality, the decision-making processes should be comparativie with
high moral and ethical standards. Thus, collectively, we can see the key
attributes of procedural justice:
Table 1 - Attributes of Procedural Justice
* Process control (voice and an opportunity to be
heard)
* Neutral decision-maker (bias suppression)
* Trustworthy decision-maker
* Treating persons
(standing)

with

dignity

and

respect

118. See Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and SelfRepresented Litigants, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 48-50 (2007).
119. See Blader & Tyler, supranote 108, at 749.
120. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What do
Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19
BEHAV. Sci. &LAw215, 233-35 (2001).
121. See Leventhal, supra note 105, at2l-35.
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* Consistency across persons and time
* Predicated on accurate information
* Correctability
* Representativeness
* Ethicality

While each of these attributes shapes' experiences of procedural
justice, they rarely operate independently; instead, they combine to
constitute gestalt experiences of procedural justice. These attributes can
be simultaneously promoted to design a justice system experienced as
122
just.
c.

Consequences of Procedural Justice

Experiencing the civil justice system as procedurally just shapes
subsequent thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.1 2 3 When people believe
that they have experienced fair process, they tend to view that process as
just and legitimate, regardless of whether it produces an outcome that
favors them or not. 124 This phenomenon, which has been described as
the "fair process effect,"l 25 includes the influence of experiences of
procedural justice on psychological phenomena, including perceptions of
fairness, outcome satisfaction, acceptance of legal decrees, satisfaction
with the handling of a dispute, and subsequent behavior. 12 6
Emotions may operate as either a cause or a consequence of how
one experiences procedural injustice. For example, on the one hand,
negative evaluations of procedures may engender anger and negative
emotions; on the other, negative emotions may result in negative
evaluations of procedures. The affective model of justice reasoning
(AMJR) posits that, when a decision generates strong negative emotions,
122. See Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?,supra note 95, at 131. For a discussion
on how litigants experience tradeoffs between procedural justice and the direct cost of
procedures borne by the public, see Victor D. Quintanilla, Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs:
Examining How the Public Experiences Tradeoffs Between ProceduralJustice and Cost,
15 NEV. L.J. 882, 883-927 (2015).
123. See Van den Bos et al., supra note 98.
124. See Walker et al., supra note 110, at 298-301; Stephen LaTour et al., Some
Determinants of Preferencefor Modes of Conflict Resolution, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
319, 319-56 (1976); Pauline Houlden et al., Preferencefor Modes of Dispute Resolution
as a Function of Process andDecision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 13,
13-30 (1978).
125. See Walker et al., supra note 110, at 295-310.
126. See Van den Bos, supra note 98, at 277-78.
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people will engage in biased information processing, seeking out
information that confirms their negative evaluations while disregarding
evidence to the contrary.1 27
Research has demonstrated that procedural justice has important
downstream effects on behavior as well. In the legal context, procedural
justice promotes acceptance of legal decisions and compliance with
law.1 28 For example, in criminal proceedings, procedural justice
decreases recidivism.1 2 9 Relatedly, organizational behavior researchers
have shown that procedural justice within business organizations
promotes pro-social and cooperative workplace behavior, elevates
commitment to organizations and institutions, and dampens strife and
conflict in workplaces.
Organizational justice researchers have
demonstrated that procedural justice promotes organizational citizenship
behavior, job satisfaction, and the acceptance of supervisor directives
and company policies.
Conversely, when employees are denied
procedural justice, they are less likely to cooperate with supervisors and
more likely to engage in overt and covert disobedience and antisocial
behaviors.1 3 0
Finally, research has revealed that experiences of procedural
injustice threaten, erode, and destabilize intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
group-based motivations and bonds vital to democracy and vibrant
communities. On an intrapersonal level, experiences of procedural
injustice increase stress and aggression, sapping trust in the legitimacy of
institutions. On an interpersonal and group-based level, procedural
injustice erodes cooperation and tolerance within groups and
communities. On a societal level, procedural injustice erodes beliefs
about the importance of the rule of law and destabilizes beliefs about the
importance of universal values and norms requiring that all people be

&

127 See Elizabeth Mullen, The Reciprocal Relationship Between Affect and
Perceptions of Fairness, in DISTRIBUTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, RESEARCH
SOCIAL APPLICATIONS 15, 16 (Kjell Tornblom & Riel Vermunt, Ed. 2007) (According to
the "Affective Model of Justice Reasoning (AMJR) . . . affect and perceptions of justice
should be considered to have a reciprocal relationship.").
128. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and CorporateDispute Resolution: Using
ProceduralFairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224-51 (1993);
Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 115-91 (1992); Jonathan Jackson et al.,
Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal
Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 (2012); Tyler, Psychological
Perspectiveson Legitimacy, supra note 25, at 375-400.
129. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of
ProceduralJustice on Spouse Assault, 31 L. & SOC'Y REV. 163, 180-85, 192-95 (1997);
Denise C. Gottfredson et al., How Drug Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of
Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 3 (2007).
130. Lind et al., supra note 128, at 224-51.
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treated with human dignity. In contrast, procedural justice facilitates
cooperation, pro-social citizenship behavior, and demonstrations of civic
virtue, encouraging people to contribute to public goods.
These downstream implications of procedural justice are deeply
significant to a vibrant, robust democracy. Procedural justice shapes the
degree to which the public perceives legal officials-judges, mediators,
and courts-as legitimate. This wellspring of legitimacy, in turn, affects
the public's willingness to accept decrees and voluntarily comply with
law. Our democracy requires both voluntary compliance with law and
cooperation with authorities. 13 1 Therefore, procedural justice contributes
to the perceived legitimacy of our civil justice system132 and sustains
democratic norms and the legal institutions of our democracy. For this
reason, human-centered civil justice design harnesses the theories,
methods, and. best evidence available on procedural justice when
evaluating the public's experience of civil justice.
2.

Distributive Justice

While procedural justice influences experiences of justice,
distributive justice shapes these experiences as well. Psychological
research on distributive justice examines experiences of justice that relate
to the allocation of socially desirable or undesirable phenomena. 133
Issues of distribution may arise whenever something desirable is scarce,
such that not everyone can have what they need or want, or whenever
something undesirable cannot be avoided by all. For example, this
research examines experiences of justice that relate to the allocation of
socially desirable goods, including allocations of rights, honor, wealth,

131. See Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy, supra note 25, at 379;
Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of ProceduralJustice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Supportfor Policing, 37 L. & Soc'Y REV. 513, 535 (2003); Andrew V.
Papachristos et al., Why do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence ofLegitimacy and
Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 435-38
(2012); Jackson et al., supra note 128, at 1058-64; De Cremer & Tyler, supra note 113,
at 639-41; Steven L. Bidder et al., ProceduralJustice and Retaliation in Organizations:
Comparing Cross-nationally the Importance of Fair Group Processes, 12 INT'L J.
CONFLICT MGMT. 295, 304-09 (2001); David De Cremer et al., Managing Cooperation
via ProceduralFairness: The Mediating Influence of Self-other Merging, 26 J. ECON..
PSYCHOL. 393, 401-03 (2005).
132.

See LIND & TYLER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note

30, at 72-73; Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, PopularLegitimacy and the Exercise of
Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 78, 78-79 (2014); Shestowsky, supra note 30, at 643-44.
133.

See MORTON

DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE:

A

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVE (1st ed. 1985); Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, supra note 93, at 68.
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and other benefits (or socially undesirable phenomena, such as pollution
and harms).13 4
Rather than measuring outcomes based on their absolute
favorability, people evaluate outcomes based on their consistency with
principles of outcome fairness, including principles of equity, equality,
and need.1 3 ' Equity may be considered normatively appropriate in
workplace settings, whereas equality and need may be considered more
appropriate in other interpersonal settings. The equality principle
connotes that socially desirable goods are distributed equally regardless
of one's relative contributions, whereas the principle of need intimates
that resources should be distributed to those who need them most. The
principle of need, for example, may be normatively appropriate and
ethically preferred in interactions with people who are unable to provide
for themselves, such as children and the elderly.
Conflicts may emerge when people differ in their endorsement of
these distributive justice principles. 136 Even when people agree on the
superordinate value underlying - a distribution (e.g., equity, equality,
need), they may disagree on the criteria used to specify these values. 137
That is, when implementing a superordinate distributive value, civil
justice designers may need to engage in human-centered design when
selecting and elaborating.the criteria representing that value.
C.

HarnessingExperiences ofJustice in Human-CenteredCivil Justice
Design

Human-centered civil justice is rooted in human experience, needs,
beliefs, concerns, and the adversities that people encounter in the
everyday.
Understanding how members of the public encounter,
navigate, and experience the civil justice system. allows designers to
create civil processes, systems, and environments that promote human
flourishing. To accomplish this purpose, civil justice designers draw on
psychological science concerning both procedural justice and distributive
justice. These dimensions interact and combine holistically to form
experiences ofjustice. 38
134. See Guillermina Jasso et al., Distributive Justice, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
supra note 91, at 201, 201-18.
135. See Karen A. Hegtvedt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice: Recent
TheoreticalDevelopments andApplications, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW,
supranote 94, at 93, 93-125.
136. See DEUTSCH, supra note 133, at 1-6.
137. See id.
138. See Joel Brockner & Batia M. Wiesenfeld, An Integrative Framework for
ExplainingReactions to Decisions: Interactive Effects of Outcomes andProcedures, 120
PSYCHOL. BULL. 189, 189 (1996); Van den Bos, supra note 102, at 931-41; Kjell Y.
Tornblom & Riel Vermunt, An Integrative Perspective on Social Justice: Distributive
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By cultivating civil processes, systems, and environments that
promote stakeholders' experiences of justice, human-centered designers'
efforts yield intrapersonal, interpersonal, group-based, and societal-level
Justice experiences that emerge from the interaction of
benefits.
procedural and distributive justice smooth and shape social interactions
and foster cooperation between individuals, between individuals and
groups, and among members of society. A concern for justice serves a
wide variety of intrapersonal and interpersonal needs and promotes
cooperation and reciprocity within and between groups and
39
communities.1
With regard to interpersonal needs, the belief in a just world serves
an existential function:. human psychology is such that people yearn to
believe that the world is a just place, where everyone receives what he or
she deserves, and where everyone deserves what he or she receives. 14 0 In
this way, an interpersonal concern for justice contributes to a sense of
meaning in what people do and in the things that happen to people. 14 1
A concern for justice serves intrapersonal- and group-based needs
as well by establishing positive relationships with others and leading to
harmony within groups, including encourating trust, reciprocity, and
cooperation between individuals and among group members.1 4 2 Justice
helps to regulate conflicts between individuals and conflicts between
groups and communities. For example, absent a sense that authority
figures and decision-makers are just, compliance with dispute resolution
is merely an instrumental decision, one based on an egoistic decision of
whether compliance would be personally desirable.1 4 3 In contrast, the
normative validity of law is closely, linked to a sense of justice, which
engenders normative compliance, restorative justice, and acceptance of
the results of conflict resolution.1 4 4
Moreover, when judicial officials behave so as to grant the public
experiences of justice, this ethical behavior has a powerful influence on
legal officials themselves. Social psychological research has revealed
that how people act influences their attitudes and beliefs, illuminating a

&

and ProceduralFairnessEvaluations of Positive and Negative Outcome Allocations, 12
Soc. JUST. RES. 39, 39-40 (1999).
139. See Mario Gollwitzer et al., Victim Sensitivity and the Accuracy of Social
Judgments, 38 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 975, 975-84 (2012); Gollwitzer
van Prooijen, supra note 93, at 62-77.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Ellard et al., supranote 91, at 130-31.
See id.
See Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, supra note 93, at 62-77.
See Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, at 65-69.
See id.
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counterintuitive insight: the primacy of behavior on attitudes.145 Indeed,
Lee Ross and Thomas Gilovich conclude,

".

. . one of the most

consistent and remarkable findings in the behavioral science literature
over the past century is that people's behavior is often more predictive of
their attitudes than their attitudes are of their behavior." 46 When legal
officials act in a way that seems consistent with a particular belief and
value, they are inclined to endorse that belief and value. This primacy of
behavior on attitudes and beliefs results from the psychological dynamic
of cognitive dissonance and dissonance reduction. 147 This powerful
insight is a foundation of cognitive-behavioral therapy, one of the most
successful forms of psychological and behavioral therapy. 148
Facilitating experiences of justice has intrapersonal, interpersonal,
relational, and group-based effects on legal officials themselves. The
more legal officials behave in a way that provides dignified and
respectful treatment to all members of the public, especially members
from disadvantaged groups, the more legal officials will believe and
value the social identities and social groups to which all belong. The
more legal officials provide procedural justice and interactional justice to
all members of society, the more legal authorities will regard all social
groups as truly participating in and belonging to our democratic society.
The more legal officials behave in a way that provides all people
dignified and respectful treatment, the more legal officials will believe

145. See generally THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE Ross, THE WISEST ONE IN THE RooM:
How You CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY'S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS 10 1-30

&

(2015).
146. Id. at 108; see also Gary L. Wells & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Overt Head
Movements on Persuasion: Compatibility and Incompatibility of Responses, 1 BASIC
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 219, 219-30 (1980); John T. Cacioppo et al., Rudimentary
Determinants of Attitudes: II. Arm Flexion and Extension Have DifferentialEffects on
Attitudes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1993); Jesse Chandler & Norbert
Schwarz, How Extending Your Middle Finger Affects Your Perception of Others:
LearnedMovements Influence ConceptAccessibility, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
123, 123-24 (2009).
147. See GILOVICH & Ross, supra note 145, at 112; LEON FESTINGER, THE THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Michael I. Norton et al., The IKEA Effect: When Labor
Leads to Love, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 453, 453-60 (2012).
148. See JEFFREY M. SCHWARTZ & SHARON BEGLEY, THE MIND AND THE BRAIN:
NEUROPLASTICITY AND THE POWER OF MENTAL FORCE (2003) ("By the mid-1980s,

.

cognitive therapy was being used more and more in combination with behavioral therapy
for OCD, and it seemed naturally compatible with a mindfulness-based perspective. . .
[A] cognitive-behavioral approach, infused with mindful awareness, could be marshaled
against the disease, and if successful therapy were accompanied by changes in brain
activity, then it would represent a significant step toward demonstrating the causal
efficacy of mental activity on neural circuits.").
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that promoting human dignity and human worth are important values of
the civil justice System.14 9
As such, civil justice designers draw on psychological science
regarding justice to enhance their understanding and evaluation of legal
processes, legal institutions, and conflict resolution. They ensure that
legal processes and institutions are experienced as just, in part to
engender legal structures with normative validity, which reduces the
likelihood that people will decide, after egoistic calculations, not to
comply with the outcomes of legal processes. Moreover, civil justice
designers seek to create legal processes and institutions experienced as
just to sustain pro-social behavior, cooperation, and intergroup harmony,
thereby allowing humans to achieve their full potential and democracy to
flourish. Finally, designers draw upon psychological research on how
and why disputes emerge and ways of resolving conflict to encourage
institutions and structures that engender peaceful resolutions of
disputes.150

Having elaborated the theory of human-centered civil justice design,
the Article next introduces the rulemaking process that designed the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Chief Justice
Roberts's 2015 year-end report in which he lauds the amendments and
their implications on managerial judging.
II.

2015 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2015 YEAR-END REPORT

A.

The 2015 Amendments: Rulemaking in Need ofRedesign

A survey conducted by the Institute for Advancement of the
American Legal System (IAALS) of members of the American College

149. As the Talmud states, "One should always occupy himself with Torah and good
deeds, [even ifj it be not for their own sake, for out of good work misapplied in purpose
there comes [the desire to do it] for its own sake." Babylonian Talmud: Tractate
Sanhedrin 105b, http://www.come-and-hear.com/sanhedrin/ sanhedrin 105.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2017). I credit Lee Ross and Thomas Gilovich for finding this quote and
sharing the wisdom in this Babylonian Talmud.
150. For another day, I leave the twilight between an objectively just civil justice
system and a civil justice system experienced by all stakeholders as just. While I will not
gainsay the importance of this distinction, the approach I have elaborated is an
incremental one. If all stakeholders agree that the civil justice system is just, that it
embraces the needs, concerns, and desires of present and future generations, then a
human-centered designer would doubtless turn to other societal problems. Those who
contend that their vision of justice system is the most just, even if stakeholders do not
agree, and regardless of whether the system would be experienced as just to stakeholders
now or in the future, embellish an enigma.
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for Trial Lawyers (ACTL) catalyzed the 2015 amendments.151 The
survey suggested that ACTL lawyers believed the "civil justice system is
not broken, [but] it is in serious need of repair" and "litigation in general
and discovery in particular are too expensive." 1 52 Given these concerns,
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference asked the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules to
hold a conference evaluating the costs and delays of civil litigation
within the federal civil justice system.153 The Advisory Committee voted
to hold a Civil Litigation Review Conference to discuss costs and delays,
and tasked the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) with conducting empirical
studies on federal civil litigation to examine costs. 15 4 This Civil
Litigation Review Conference, held at Duke University School of Law in
May 2010, assembled judges, lawyers, legal scholars, and interest
155

groups.
Before the conference, the FJC researched federal litigation costs1 56

and prepared reports examining costs in federal civil cases, revealing a
151. See John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 538
(2010); Interim Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers
Task Force on Discovery & the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL Sys. 3 (2008), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/inte
rim_report final for web.pdf [hereinafter Interim Report]; see also Final Report on the
Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery & the
Institute for the Advancement of the .American Legal System, AM. COLL. OF TRIAL
LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., 2 (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/finalreport
onthejointproject of the actl task force on discoveryand the iaals_1.pdf
[hereinafter Joint Report] (summarizing results, and stating "In short, the survey revealed
widely-held opinions that there are serious problems in the civil justice system
generally.").
152. Interim Report, supra note 151, at 3-4; see also Preserving Access and
Identifying Excess: Areas of Convergence and Consensus in the 2010 Conference
Materials, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., 5 (2010), http://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/iaals_preservingaccess-and-identifying excessO.pdf
153. See Koeltl, supra note 151, at 538-39.
154. See id.; Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost
in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 767 (2010) [hereinafter Lee & Willging,
Defining the Problem of Cost].
155. See Koeltl, supra note 151, at 538-39; see also 2010 Civil Litigation
Conference, U.S. COURTS,http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archivesrules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil (last visited Mar. 14,
2017).
156. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, FederalJudicial Center National,
Case-BasedCivil Rules Survey: PreliminaryReport to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2009) [hereinafter Lee & Willging, CaseBased Civil Rules Survey], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurvl.pdf/$file
/dissurv1 .pdf ; see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Litigation Costs in Civil
Cases: MultivariateAnalysis: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2-4 (2010) [hereinafter Lee & Willging, Multivariate
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wide divergence between the impressions of many ACTL lawyers and
1 7
the costs actually associated with litigating in federal court.s The FJC
conducted a case-based study of litigation costs in closed federal civil
cases from the last quarter of 2008 and surveyed more than 2,000
attorneys of record. 1 8 This study revealed that in cases where one or
more kinds of discovery are reported, median litigation costs were
$15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants, meaning that half of
159
all attorneys reported costs below these median amounts.
The FJC's study also revealed the ratio of discovery costs to total
costs:' 60 plaintiffs' attorneys reported a median of 20 percent, and

defendants' attorneys reported a median of 27 percent. 16 1 The FJC also
asked attorneys to report what ratio of discovery costs to litigation costs
made them uncomfortable.1 62 For both sets of attorneys, these actual
median cost ratios were well below what those attorneys thought
troubling. 163 Finally, researchers concluded that the monetary stakes in
particular cases (i.e., potential liability) represent the single-best

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/$file/costcivl.pdf;
Analysis],
Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee ill, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter

Wiliging & Lee, In Their Words], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf1lookup/costciv3.pdf
/$file/costciv3.pdf.
157. See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost, supra note 154, at 770-71;
see also Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-DelayNarrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its
Fallacies& Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2012); Report to the ChiefJustice of
the U.S. on the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES AND THE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3 n.2

&

(2010) [hereinafter Report to the, Chief Justice of the U.S. on the 2010 Conference],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/report to-the-chiefjustice.pdf.
158. See Lee & Willging, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 35-36.
The study excluded large categories of cases from the study because they generally do
not involve discovery, including prisoner civil rights and habeas corpus cases.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 28.
161. See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 154, at 779-80; Lee
Willging, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 38-39, tbls. 6 & 7.
162. See Lee & Willging, Case-BasedCivil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 40.
163. See id. The FJC's estimate is generally consistent with previous studies. The
Columbia Project study from the 1960s estimated that discovery accounted for between
&

19 and 36 percent of litigation costs. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
The Civil Litigation Project in the 1970s
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 180 tbl.43 (1968).

found that, in ordinary cases, 16.7 percent of attorney time was spent in discovery. See
David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B.
Grossman, The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91 tbl.3 (1983). In
the 1990s, the Rand Corporation found that in cases lasting longer than 270 days,
discovery consumed a little over one-third (36 percent) of attorney work hours. See
James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel F. McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas
M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil
Reform JusticeAct Evaluation Data, B.C. L. REV. 613, 641-50 (1998).
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predictor and cost driver.1 64 Taken together, the FJC's analysis reveals
that high discovery costs are not pervasive. Instead, discovery costs
escalate only in a subset of complex federal litigation cases with large
potential monetary judgments.' 6 5 The FJC's studies reveal that, in actual
litigated cases, most attorneys believed that discovery costs were
generally proportionate to their clients' stakes.
While the FJC surveyed attorneys who litigated specific cases and
investigated facts and impressions linked to those specific cases, several
lawyers organizations-the American Bar Association (ABA), the
National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), and the ACTLsurveyed their members for general impressions about the federal civil
justice system. 16 6 A majority of ABA members expressed satisfaction
with the federal system.1 6 7 Many believed the rules provide a sound
framework for the conduct of civil litigation and that, in general, counsel
agree on the scope and timing of discovery.
Unlike the ABA, NELA is comprised primarily of plaintiff-side
employment lawyers, 169 many of whom expressed that the federal rules
were not conducive to securing a "just, speedy, and inexpensive
70
determination of every action."o
In addition, many NELA members
believed that federal courts have grown increasingly hostile to
employment claims, that rules are applied inconsistently,' 7 1 that their

164. See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost, supra note 154, at 771-72;
Lee & Willging, MultivariateAnalysis, supra note 156, at 5, 7.
165. Id.
166. Two of these surveys were administered by the FJC and surveyed members of
the American Bar Association and National Employment Lawyers Association. The
Institute for Advancement of Legal Studies conducted a survey of the American College
of Trial Lawyers. See generally Lorna G. Schofield, ABA Section ofLitigation Member
Survey on Civil Practice: Detailed Report, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/aba section of litigation survey on
civilpractice_.pdf; Rebecca M. Hamburg & Matthew C. Koski, Summary of Results of
FederalJudicial Center Survey ofNELA Members, NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS Ass'N (2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/nela-summaryof resultsof fjc surveyof n
cla_members.pdf.
167. About half of the ABA respondents surveyed represent primarily defendants,
about a quarter represent primarily plaintiffs, and the remaining quarter represent
plaintiffs and defendants about equally. See Schofield, supra note 166, at 5, 7-8 ("Sixtythree percent of respondents agree that the Rules, as written, are conducive to meeting the
goal of a 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,' and 61% agree
that the Rules are adequate as written.").
168. See Schofield, supra note 166, at 42 ("About 67% of all lawyers disagree that the
Rules need a major overhaul. .. "), 75 ("Approximately 60% of plaintiffs' lawyers, 66%
of mixed practice lawyers, and 68% of defense lawyers believe that counsel agree on the
scope and timing of discovery in a majority of cases.").
169. See Hamburg & Koski, supra note 166, at 3, 4.
170. FED. R. CIv. P. 1; see Hamburg & Koski, supra note 166, at 4, 25.
171. See Hamburg & Koski, supra note 166, at 4, 130.
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opponents abuse discovery in almost every case, and that sanctions
designed to curb discovery are seldom imposed. 172
In contrast to the ABA and NELA, the surveyed ACTL members
primarily defend, large, complex cases.' 73 Many of these attorneys
believed that "litigation is too expensive., 174 IAALS's report concluded
that the American civil justice system, including the federal system, is
"in serious need of repair."

As the FJC revealed, ABA, NELA, and ACTL members differed
markedly in their overall satisfaction with the federal rules. 176
Specifically, ABA members were much more satisfied with the federal

rules than were members of NELA or ACTL. 7 7 Moreover, the three
groups differed when answering the prompt: "discovery is abused in
This question, among others, was likely
almost every case." 17 '
interpreted in different ways because of the differing stances between
Nevertheless, none of these lawyer
plaintiffs and defendants.' 79
organizations agreed that "the rules must be revised in their entirety and
rewritten." 8 0
After these surveys were collected, the Duke Conference was
18
held, ' which consisted of 11 panels over two days to discuss aspects of
civil litigation, including pleadings, discovery, e-discovery, and

172. See id. at 6, 11, 30.
173. See Joint Report, supra note 151, at 2 ("Twenty-four percent represent plaintiffs
exclusively, 31 percent represent defendants exclusively and 44 percent represent both,
but primarily defendants. About 40 percent of the respondents litigate complex
commercial disputes, but fewer than 20 percent litigate primarily in federal court . . .").
174. See Interim Report, supra note 151, at 4 ("85 percent thought that litigation in
general and discovery in particular are too expensive.").
175. See id. at 3 ("Although the civil justice system is not broken, it is in serious need
of repair. The survey shows that the system is not working; it takes too long and costs
too much.").
176. See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Attorney Satisfaction
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2010) [hereinafter Lee & Willging,
Attorney Satisfaction], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costc
iv2.pdf.
177. See id at 13 fig.1.
178. Id. at 18; see also id. at 15 fig.5.
179. See id. at 8 (citing Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on
John Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REv. 649, 654-55 (1989)
(cataloguing five forms of discovery abuse)). The difference observed between plaintiffand defendant-side attorneys may also be shaped by self-serving biases. See, e.g., George
Loewsenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairnessand PretrialBargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conduct, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 176 (1992).

180.
181.

See Lee & Willging, Attorney Satisfaction, supranote 176, at 6, Figure 2.
See Koeltl, supra note 151, at 542.
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settlement.8 2 Several themes emerged, including the need for more
active judicial case management, greater cooperation among counsel, and
concerns with e-discovery. 183 After the conference, the Advisory
Committee prepared a report for the Chief Justice, stating "there was no
demand at the Conference for a change to the rule language [of Rule
26(b)]; there is no clear case for present reform."l 84 Importantly, no
consensus was forged on the nature of the cost or delay problems
associated with federal litigation or the need for rule amendments to
address these concerns.185
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice prompted the chair of the Advisory
Committee to engage in rulemaking with the information presented at the
conference.186 Judge John G. Koeltl was tasked with carrying through
this work, focusing on three main goals: (1) proportionality in discovery,
(2) cooperation among lawyers, and (3) early and active . case
management. 187 The Advisory Committee solicited more studies from
182. See id.
183. See id; see generally Fabio Arcila Jr., PlausibilityPleadingas Misprescription,
80 BROOK. L. REv. 1487, 1489 (2015) (noting that conference participants wanted to
focus on education of judges so that they could properly exercise discretion in case
management, especially with regards to pleadings); Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the
Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAvIS L. REv 1483, 1518 (2013) (discussing the
Duke Conference's focus on pleadings); Julia M. Ong, Another Step in the Evolution of
E-Discovery: Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure Yet Again?, 18 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 404, 421-22 ("[The] general consensus that amendments need to be
made to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to specifically address the outstanding
issues concerning e-discovery.").
184. Report to the Chief Justice of the U.S. on the 2010 Conference, supra note 157,
at 8; see also Koeltl, supra note 151, at 543 ("The panel on discovery did reach a
consensus that there are tools available in the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
deal with discovery abuse.").
185. Compare Koeltl, supra note 151, at 543 ("A central issue for the discovery panel
was whether discovery abuse exists and, if so, what should be done about it. As already
noted, the empirical research by the Federal Judicial Center tended to indicate that in
most cases attorneys were satisfied with the amount and proportionality of discovery,
although other surveys indicated more dissatisfaction with the state of discovery. The
division of views on the incidence of abusive discovery [was] reflected . . . . Carrington,
meanwhile, notes that complaints about the costs of discovery have existed for decades
and may be due in part to laudable efforts to provide access to the courts for people who
deserve to have their rights vindicated."), with Report to the Chief Justice on the 2010
Conference, supra note 157, at 5 ("One recurring question is the extent to which new or
amended rules are needed as opposed to more frequent and effective use of the existing
rules . . .. Conference participants noted that many of the problems that exist could be
substantially reduced by using the existing rules more often and more effectively."); see
also Honorable Craig B. Shaffer, The "Burdens" of Applying Proportionality, 16
SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 67 (2015) (pointing to the common 'myth' that discovery costs are
the largest driver of litigation cost).
186. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1594 n.131.
187. See Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on
Rules of Practice and Procedure 4 (May 8, 2013), http:www.uscourts.gov/file/14696.
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the FJC and held a mini-conference in October 2012 to receive additional
input from lawyers, judges, and law professors.18 8
In 2013, the Advisory Committee, with the approval of the Standing
Committee, published proposals for public comment to amend Rule 1,
Rule 16, Rule 26, and Rule 84 that contradicted the earlier summary the
Advisory Committee provided to the Chief Justice in 2010.189 Legal
scholars have critiqued these amendments as anti-private enforcement. 190
In large part, the amendments themselves mirror the proposals of
defense-oriented interest groups, based on examples of Arizona and
Oregon state court procedures.' 9 1 Yet attorneys who practice in Arizona
and Oregon state courts believed that litigation costs in their own state
systems were also too expensive.1 92 Indeed, many of these lawyers
believed that their own state systems do not work well and rated only a
slight preference for their state court procedures. 193

188. See Agenda, CIVIL RULES COMM. 77 (Apr. 11-12, 2013), http://www.uscourts.
gov/file/15484.
189. Compare Report to the ChiefJustice on the 2010 Conference, supra note 156, at
8 ("[Tlhere was no demand at the Conference for a change to the rule language; there is
no clear case for present reform."), and Koeltl, supra note 150, at 543 ("The panel on
discovery did reach a consensus that there are tools available in the current Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to deal with discovery abuse."), with Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 264 (2013),
http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/archives/attach/preliminary-draft-proposedamendments.pdf.
190. See Burbank & Farhang, supranote 38, at 1592-93.
191. See Reshaping the Rules of Civil Procedurefor the 21' Century: The Need for
Clear, Concise, and Meaningful Amendments to Key Rules of Civil Procedure, LAWYERS
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE DRI i, xi (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/reshaping
the rules for the_21st century 0.pdf ("Against this background we propose a new
Rule 26(b)(1): Scope in General. The Scope of discovery is limited to any nonprivileged
matter that would support proof of a claim or defense and must comport with the
proportionalityassessment required by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).") (emphasis added); Survey of
the Arizona Bench & Bar on the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., 26-27, 29-42 (2010) [hereinafter Arizona Rules
of Civil Procedure], http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/surv
eyarizona benchbar2010.pdf (discussing the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure's
presumptive limits on discovery); Survey of the Oregon Bench & Bar on the Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., 31-43

(2010) [hereinafter Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure], http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default
/files/documents/publications/survey oregon bench bar2010.pdf (discussing restrictions
on discovery under the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan
M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245,
266-67 (2010) ("The Oregon Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the state's
commitment to fact pleading.").
192. See Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 190, at 44, fig.44; Oregon
Rules of Civil Procedure,supra note 190, at 54, fig.5 1.
193. See Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure,supra note 190, at 37, fig.35.
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The amendments were readied for notice and comment and received
over 2,300 public comments, a remarkable number. 194 Many hundreds of
comments were critical of the proposals. 195 Nevertheless, the proposed
amendments were altered only slightly 96 before the Advisory
Committee, Standing Committee, and Judicial Conference approved
them. 197
When taken together and viewed holistically as a system of civil
justice design, this rulemaking process can and should be substantially
improved. To begin, the community assembled at the Duke Conference
was divided when defining the causes, conditions, and nature of the
problems of cost and delay in the system. 19 8 Indeed, the high-quality,
case-specific data prepared by the FJC contradicted the general
impressionistic concerns of ATLA attorneys. 199 Moreover, the public
who engages with this system and the judges who manage it were not
surveyed about their experiences,200 which is a critical step in any
human-centered design approach to defining and evaluating the nature of
a problem. 20 1 Finally, the scant evidence available on the proposed
194.

See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-20
13-0002 (last visited Mar. 21, 2017) (showing 2,356 comments received on the proposed
amendments).
195. See Joe Palazzolo & Jess Bravin, Businesses Win Lawsuit Curbs with New
Rules: Change could help companies in their battle against consumer litigation, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2016); see also Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar over Discovery Rules;
Litigation costs at center of debate, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 2014, at 1; Rebecca L. Shult,
2,000+ Public Comments Submitted Responding to Proposed Changes to FRCP,
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-dd0982a27c5a-4001-8380-648939119c8a.
196. See Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, supra note 187, at 4..
197. See id.
198. See Koeltl, supra note 151, at 543; See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem of
Cost, supra note 154, at 771-72.
199. See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost, supra note 154, at 771-72.
200. See Hon. Paul W. Grimm, The State ofDiscovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must
the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens, Or Can Significant Improvements
Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 47, 47 n.2 (2011)
("Interestingly, there do not appear to have been any recent surveys of judges to learn
their perceptions regarding any shortcomings in the civil litigation system; their views
with respect to suggested changes that should be adopted; or their opinions regarding
how well they fulfill their obligations to manage the pretrial process, including prompt
resolution of discovery disputes . . . . Given the central importance that all the lawyer
surveys . . place on active involvement of judges in and management of the pretrial
process, it would be highly instructive to see what the judges are thinking on these
issues.").
201. Indeed, there is considerable reason to believe that the public's concern with cost
and time is of a different class than those elaborated. See FEELEY, supra note 46
(discussing the public's concern in misdemeanor court with outlaying costs of securing
counsel and the opportunity cost (if any) of not using an attorney, the loss of work time
associated with mounting a case, and the cost of continuances and court appearances,
REGULATIONS.GOV,

2017]1

HUMAN-CENTERED CIVI JUSTICE DESIGN

783

amendments suggested that the solutions were at best inadequate and at
worst ill-advised.20 2 There was no empirical testing or piloting of the
proposed solutions in advance, nor were there RCTs to evaluate their
effect on stakeholders or the dynamics of the federal civil justice system.
Recently, Burbank and Farhang have characterized the amendments
as "a partisan project" 203 carried out by a political institution where some
interests counted more than empirical evidence.
They call for
improvements of the process to ensure that it is adequate for the future.204
B.

The ChiefJustice's2015 Year-End Report: Extolling Efficient
Justice

Chief Justice Roberts's 2015 year-end report is significant. 205 In his
report, the Chief Justice interpreted the recent amendments and called for
a change in legal culture oriented toward prompt and efficient justice. 206
These amendments-Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 16, 26(b)(1), 37(e), 84-reshape
how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be construed, alter the
discovery available to parties, and impact access to the federal civil
justice system.20 7 The Chief Justice began his remarks by characterizing
the problem that the amendments were designed to address: "while the
federal courts are fundamentally sound, in many cases civil litigation has
which result in lost work time, stress, and attorneys' fees); Emery G. Lee III, Law
Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost ofLegal Services, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 499, 503 (2015) ("In sum, the Little Guy's problem is the increasing cost of civil
litigation; he is being priced out of the market for legal services. The Big Guy's problem
is too much information and, thus, too much discovery.").
202. For example, though the amendments are based upon Oregon and Arizona state
rules, attorneys who practice in these states continue to lament excessive cost and delay
in their own state systems.
203. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1596. Many other scholars have criticized
either the rulemaking process or the result. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The
Anti-PlaintiffPendingAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand the ProDefendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083
(2015); A. Benjamin Spencer, The FormsHadA Function: Rule 84 and the Appendix of
Forms as Guardiansof the Liberal Ethos in Civil Procedure, 15 NEv. L. J. 1113 (2015).
204. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38, at 1596.
205. See 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41.
206. See generally Trevor Gillum, The Convergence Awakens: How Principles of
Proportionalityand Callsfor Cooperationare Reshaping the E-Discovery Landscape, 23
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 741 (2016) (discussing Roberts's focus on "speedy, fair,
efficient justice"); Clare Kealey, Discovering Flaws: An Analysis of the Amended
FederalRule of Civil Procedure37(e) and Its Impact on the Spoliation of Electronically
Stored Evidence, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 140 (2016) (noting Roberts's
endorsement of the amendments as marking a significant change); Symposium, Recent
Trends in Discovery in Arbitration and in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 34. REV.
LITIG. 705 (2015) (commenting on Roberts' support of meaningful change following the
revisions).
207. See 2015 Year-End Report, supranote 41, at 4-5.
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become too expensive, time-consuming, and contentious, inhibiting
effective access to the courts."20 8 He then stated that the conference had
identified the need for procedural reforms that would "engage judges in
early and active case management," "encourage greater cooperation
among counsel," "focus discovery . .. on what is truly necessary to

resolve the case," 2 09 and address new problems associated with
electronically stored information. The Chief Justice applauded the
amendments, remarking that the amendments "mark significant change,
for both lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil trial," 210 and
that "we must engineer a change in our legal culture that places a
premium on the public's interest in speedy, fair, and efficient justice."2 11
The year-end report is significant for a second reason: federal district

208. Id at,4., Although Chief Justice Roberts cites the Duke University School of
Law 2010 Civil Litigation Conference to support this articulation of the problem, the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure offered a notably different perspective. See Report to the Chief
Justice on the 2010 Conference, supra note 157. Indeed, the Advisory Committee
summarized the Federal Judicial Center's empirical data at the Duke Conference
proceedings by noting that "[b]oth FJC studies showed that in many cases filed in the
federal courts, the lawyers handling the cases viewed the discovery as reasonably
proportional to the needs of the cases and the Civil Rules as working well. The FJC
studies support the conclusion that the cases raising concerns are a relatively small
percentage of those filed in the federal courts, but the numbers and the nature of these
cases deserve close attention." Id. at 3. Moreover, a report issued by the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System reveals that, within the sample of cases
selected, 65 percent of the civil cases were resolved in one calendar year, almost 40
percent less than six months, and only 35 percent of cases expended more than one year.
See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 4 (2009). The duration of the case was strongly predicted by
the nature of the suit, with more complex commercial matters and environmental
litigation taking longer to resolve.
209. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 5.
210. Id. at 5. While the rule changes mark significant change, the empirical data
presented at the Duke Conference revealed that the vast majority of attorneys were
generally satisfied with the prior formulation of the rules. Indeed, the American Bar
Association surveyed over 3,000 attorney members, which included lawyers practicing
on the plaintiff-side, defense-side, and private and public law. Over 60 percent agreed
that the rules were adequate as previously written, over 53 percent believed that the rules
required only minor adjustment. Indeed, the ABA surveys reveal that a minority of
attorneys (25 percent), largely defense-side, believed that the rules needed to be
fundamentally rewritten. See Civil Procedure in the 2 1st Century-Some Proposals,
SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF CIVIL LITIG. OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LITIG.

&

1, 2 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/abalitigation section civil-pro
cedure in the_21st centuryO.pdf; see also Schofield, supra note 166, at 32 fig.3.0, 41
fig.3.9. Indeed, the vast majority of ABA attorneys (67.2 percent) rejected the
proposition that the "rules must be reviewed in their entirety and rewritten to address the
needs of today's litigants." Schofield, supra note 165, at 42 fig.3.10; see also Lee
Willging, Attorney Satisfaction, supra note 176, at 6-7 (finding that no party group in
any of the surveys net agreed that the rules should be overhauled).
211. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 11.

2017]

HUMAN-CENTERED CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGN

785

courts now cite the report as guidance on how to apply the newly
amended rules.212
Regarding Rule 16, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the "crucial
role of federal judges in engaging in early and effective case
management." 2 13 While Rule 16 had already required courts to engage in
214
case management,214
amended Rule 16 now requires judges to use case
management tools earlier in the process, with a preference for in-person
interactions with parties, and empowers judges with more hands-on
control over case management. Further, while Rule 16 had required
judges to meet with lawyers after filing of a complaint to confer about
case needs and to develop a management plan, amended Rule 16
shortens the deadline for these meetings by thirty days and extends the
preference for face-to-face meetings between judges and lawyers "before
filing motions in aid of discovery." 2 15 Troublingly, the Chief Justice
noted that these face-to-face encounters "often obviate the need for a
formal motion-a well-timed scowl from a trial judge can go a long way
in moving things along crisply." 2 16 While the Chief Justice may have
made this quip in jest, his discussion neglected the importance of
providing experiences of procedural justice to parties appearing in faceto-face interactions before the court.
Rule 1 was previously the interpretive guide for construing all other
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and remained untouched in its original
form since 1967.217 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that amended Rule 1
now makes "express the obligation of judges and lawyers to work
cooperatively in controlling the expense and time demands of
litigation."2 18 Chief Justice Roberts underscored that Rule 1 was
amended by only eight words, but that judges and practitioners "must
take [these words] to heart." 219 Rule 1 now directs that the Federal Rules

.

212. See Joan Summy-Long v. Pa. State Univ., No. 1:106-cv-1117, 2016 WL 74767,
at *8' (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016); Merrill Reuter, M.D., v. Physicians Casualty Risk
Retention Group, No. 16-80581-CV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2017 WL 395242, at
*2 (S.D. Fl. Jan. 27, 2017); Roberts v. Clark County School Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 60304 (D. Nev. 2016); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure
after the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 44 (2016) (discussing the fact that federal
courts will be called upon to interpret the rules and that special attention should be paid to
anything, such as Chief Justice Roberts's report, that would be likely to influence federal
judges' decisions).
213. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 7.
214. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16; Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1987).
215. See 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 7; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
(amended 2015).
216. Id.; cf FEELEY, supra note 46.
217. See Quintanilla, Taboo ProceduralTradeoffs, supra note 122, at 886.
218. 2015 Year-EndReport, supra note 41, at 7.
219. Id at 6.
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"should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the
partiesto secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding." 2 20 According to the Chief Justice, the new
passage means "lawyers . . . have an affirmative duty to work together,

and with the court, to achieve prompt and efficient resolutions of
disputes." 22' The Chief Justice's remarks, however, omit discussion of
any responsibility to ensure that disputes are resolved justly. Nor do the
remarks speak to the unsettling tradeoffs between achieving a just result
and reducing costs to the court or adversaries that the lawyers and parties
may be forced to make.222
Turning to Rule 26(b) and proportionality, the Chief Justice
elaborated that "the pretrial process must provide the parties with
efficient access to what is needed to prove a claim or defense, but
eliminate unnecessary or wasteful discovery." 223 Amended Rule 26(b)
now explicitly incorporates proportionality and cost-benefit balancing
when defining the scope of discovery.224 As such, Rule 26(b) now
permits defendants to argue that a claimant's discovery falls beyond the
scope of discovery because "the burden or expense of proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit." 2 25 Indeed, Rule 26(b) makes
proportionality an integral part of the scope of discovery: "Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case . . . ."226
The Chief Justice notes that this proportionality "assessment may,
as a practical matter, require the active involvement of a neutral arbiterthe federal judge-to guide decisions respecting the scope of
discovery." 2 2 7 "Judges must be willing to take on a stewardship role,
managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing parties alone to

220. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (amended 2015).
221. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 6 (emphasis added).
222. See Quintanilla, Taboo ProceduralTradeoffs, supra note 122 at 915-918, 924.
223. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 7.
224. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.") (amended 2015).
225. 2015 Year-End Report, supranote 41, at 6.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 7. Although the scope of Rule 26(b) has been altered ostensibly to curb
discovery abuse, survey data collected by the Federal Judicial Center revealed that most
attorneys surveyed do not believe that discovery is abused in almost every case in federal
court. See Lee & Willging, Case-BasedCivil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 71, fig.45.
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dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of litigation."2 28 Federal
judges are now much more likely to be called to resolve disagreements
about the scope of discovery earlier in the process and in face-to-face
encounters with parties. Increasingly, these encounters will turn on the
conflict between a defendant's interest in reducing the costs and burdens
of discovery and a claimant's interest in collecting evidence to be heard
on the merits of a dispute.229
Given the emphasis the Chief Justice placed on cost and delay
reduction in civil discovery, when judges engage in this proportionality
analysis, will they be more sensitive to immediate costs of civil
discovery in the case at bar than long-term benefits cumulated across
civil cases to maintain a well-functioning civil justice system? If shortterm costs of civil discovery consistently loom larger than long-term
benefits, might this impair the perceived neutrality of federal judges,
given the potential for a systematic bias and skew in favor of
defendants? 23 0
Last, Chief Justice Roberts discussed an amendment that eliminated
Rule 84, which had-since 1967-referenced an appendix containing
civil litigation forms designed to provide lawyers and unrepresented
litigants examples of proper pleading. 231 He noted that, "over the years
since their publication, many of those forms have become antiquated or
obsolete," 232 and explained that the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts assembled a group that replaced the outdated forms with
modern versions, directing the public to pro se forms. These federal
forms, including Form 11 (Pleading a Complaint), were not solely used
by pro se parties however. Federal courts have cited the forms in
published cases since 1967 as exemplars of the liberal ethos of pleading
and access to the federal judicial form that applied to uncounseled and
counseled claimants alike.

228.

2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 10.

229. Moreover, the year-end report elides one of the drivers of costs in discovery"respondents tended to view business models in many law firms as one source of
unnecessary expense in discovery." See Lee & Willging, Attorney Satisfaction, supra
note 176, at 9. If these business models are one of the primary drivers of costs in
discovery, then the satellite litigation that may emerge by altering the default rules of
discovery may ultimately and ironically drive up the billable hours expended in discovery
in cases where discovery disputes may have been resolved by informal means.
230. Psychological and behavioral research has revealed that losses often loom larger
than gains of comparable size. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Toversky, Choices,
Values, and Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOL. 341, 343-44 (1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453
(1981).
231. See 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 8-9.
232. Id. at 9.
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Absent these civil forms as procedural safe harbors, federal judges
will have increased discretion to resolve whether pleadings are sufficient
and proper under the rules, including, for example, at the pleading stage
when resolving motions to dismiss. The Chief Justice's remarks
emphasize using this discretion to reduce costs and time. Yet these are
lowest of the lofty aims cast within these civil forms that guide our civil
justice system and which federal courts should consider when
adjudicating procedural disputes.
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice elides many of the difficulties and
contested issues that entangle these particular amendments, including the
tension between prompt and efficient justice and a more capacious
understanding of justice and the diverse process values achieved by the
civil justice system. To begin, the Chief Justice bases his remarks on the
premise that the conference "confirmed that. .. in many cases civil
litigation has become too expensive, [and] time-consuming . .233Yet
the FJC's case-specific research contradicted the more general
impressionistic survey data of attorneys, discrediting the factual premise
that most civil litigation is too expensive and time-consuming. 234
Further, the Chief Justice bases his call for reengineering legal
culture change on "the public's interest in speedy, fair, and efficient
justice." 235 The public, however, was neither surveyed nor interviewed
before or after the conference about whether they desired cheaper and
faster justice. 23 6 This failure to consult the public and to meaningfully
understand their needs and experiences is compounded by the Chief
Justice's omission to caution that, when managing federal cases, federal
judges should be concerned about the public's experiences of justice and
satisfaction with the federal civil justice system. Indeed, the year-end
report neglects discussion of the care needed to balance efficient justice
and procedural justice.2 37
This gap between the nature of the problems debated at the
conference and the solutions ultimately adopted is troubling. As of yet,
the dynamic, system-wide effects of these changes have not been
evaluated on court-user experiences. How will the public experience the
coupling of earlier and more active managerial judging with the Chief
233. Id. at 4.
234. See supra Part I.A.
235. 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 11.
236. See David K. Kessler, The More You Know: How 360-Degree Feedback Could
Help FederalDistrictJudges, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 687 (2010); cf Barbara Billingsley,
Diana Lowe & Mary Stratton, Civil Justice System and the Public: Learning from
Experiences to find Practices that Work, CAN. FORUM ON CIVIL JUSTICE 1, 5-6 (2006),
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2006/cjsp-learning-en.pdf
237. See 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 11; supra Part II.B; Quintanilla,
Taboo ProceduralTradeoffs, supra note 122 at 928-29.
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Justice's call for managerial judges to carry out efficient justice? In
short, there is considerable need for a feedback mechanism that examines
the extent to which these significant changes to the federal procedural
rules, including the enlarged role of managerial judges, promote the
public's experiences of fairness and justice.
III. APPLYING HUMAN-CENTERED CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGN

Human-centered civil justice design begins with the belief that all
people who encounter, engage with, and experience the civil justice
system are the ones who hold the key to innovating and addressing the
civil justice system's most vexing problems. 238 The environments people
encounter and their interactions with others within the civil justice
system shape these experiences, 239 which, in turn, affect people's
thoughts, emotions, behaviors, needs, desires, hopes, and fears, and the
meaning they make when navigating the civil justice system.240
Human-centered civil justice design has important implications for
civil procedure rulemaking. The approach would infuse the rulemaking
process with a human-centered ethos and the vision of a civil justice
system experienced as truly just, one that meets the needs and demands
of the American public. Courts should strive for a human-centered
approach that designs a civil justice system experienced as fair,
legitimate, and just. 241 In this section, the Article elaborates upon three
recommendations rooted in the principle that stakeholder experiences of
justice should be systematically measured before and after rule changes.
In addition to civil procedure rulemaking, human-centered civil
justice design has important implications for managerial judging. The
2015 amendments mark significant change in pretrial litigation, both
emphasizing and reconfiguring the role of federal judges as managerial
and requiring earlier and more active live, in-person case management.
When engaging in this case management, courts make ,pretrial decisions
affecting the scope of litigation, the theories of liability and defenses on
which the plaintiff and defendant are able to mount evidence, and, hence,
the likelihood of summary judgment and settlement.2 42 Chief Justice
Roberts calls for federal judges to harness this new discretion with the
aim of achieving efficient justice. This call elides the importance of

238. See supra Part I.A.
239. See supra Part I.A.
240. See supra Part I.A. The process is recursive. For example, people's thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors, felt within these environments, shape their experiences of
justice.
241. See supra Part I.A.
242. See infra Part II.B.
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infusing managerial judging with procedural justice and seeking to foster
experiences of justice.
A.

Human-CenteredCivil ProcedureRulemaking

As described in Part II.A., the rulemaking process that devised the
2015 amendments so lacked empirical evidence that the basis for these
amendments has been called into doubt.243 While the Advisory
Committee gathered a community of jurists, lawyers, law professors, and
interest groups at the Duke Conference, those assembled were deeply
divided when defining problems in the federal system and on any need
for rulemaking to resolve these problems.244 In this regard, the FJC
compiled case-specific data that contradicted the general impressionistic
survey data of ATLA members largely representing defense interests in
complex litigation cases-data that were apparently the catalyst for the
rulemaking process.245
Rulemakers failed to survey federal judges, let alone the members
of the public, whose cases wound through the federal civil justice
system.246 Further, the proposed 2015 amendments were not empirically
tested by any method before being promulgated.247 Due in part to these
infirmities, Professors Steven Burbank and Sean Farhang have called for
innovations to ensure that the process is adequate in the future. 248
There is a pressing need for human-centered design in federal civil
procedure rulemaking. Our legal culture should reflect an ethic that
seeks to promote the public's experience of justice, openly reconcile
plural process values, and address diverse stakeholder concerns. Judges
and court administrators should cultivate a legal culture that values the

243. See generally Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases Make Bad
Rules: A Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L. J. 1141 (2014); see also
Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39
B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998); Will Rhee, Evidence-BasedFederal Civil Rulemaking: A New
Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60 (2013); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV.
529 (2001); Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1999);

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope
ofFederalDiscovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 14 (2001).
244. See Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, supra note 151, at 542.
245. See id. at 539-40.
246. See id.
247. See generally id; see also BARBARA BILLINGSLEY, DIANA LOWE & MARY
STRATTON, CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE PUBLIC: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCES TO
FIND PRACTICES THAT WORK 5-6 (2006), for a discussion of a Canadian civil justice

system project, which began by noting the irony between recognizing the need for public
participation yet never surveying the public.
248. See generally Burbank & Farhang, supra note 38.
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justice delivered by informal practices and formal procedures. 2 49 Courts
should evaluate how these practices and procedures shape the
experiences of those navigating the civil justice system. 25 0
This section proposes three recommendations for a more humancentered form of rulemaking. First, designers should evaluate the
experiences of all stakeholders (i.e., parties, lawyers, and judges) on a
Second, before any
case-specific basis with online surveys.251
and
RCTs should be
pilots,
amendment is promulgated, iterations,
employed to examine intended and unintended effects of such a change
on diverse stakeholders. Third, after enactment, stakeholder experiences
should be closely monitored and evaluated to study its effects.
Regarding the first recommendation, after each case closes on the
federal docket, all stakeholderS 252 would receive anonymous online
surveys administered by the FJC2 53 and keyed to CM-ECF docket
categories collecting basic demographic and dispute information.254 The
survey would examine parties' experiences of procedural justice,
including experiences with the formal rules and informal practices
applied in their case.255 Moreover, it would examine the quality of their
249.

See generally Bettina Lange, The Emotional Dimension in Legal Regulation, 29

J. LAW & Soc. 197 (2002).
250.

See David B. Rottman, Procedural Fairness as a Court Reform Agenda, 44

32, 32 (2007), http://www.proceduralfairness.org/-/media/Microsites/Files
/procedural-fairness/Rottman.ashx ("Procedural fairness ... is the organizing theory for
which 21 st-century court reform has been waiting."); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure Versus Procedural Justice, 65
DEPAUL L. REv. 323, 343-356 (2016) (noting that participation, rather than outcome, is
the key driver to perceptions of justice); see generally DEBORAH A. ECKBERG & MARCY
R. PODKOPACZ, 4TH JUDICIAL DIST. OF THE STATE OF MINN., FAMILY COURT FAIRNESS
STUDY (2004), for a discussion of a participant survey, which found that if participants
experienced fair treatment they were more likely to comply with undesirable court orders.
251. See Billingsley, Lowe & Stratton, supra note 236, at 7 (discussing how
successful a survey directed at the civil justice system is when including participants).
252. See Kessler, supra note 236, at 689 (recommending "'upward' feedback from
parties appearing before the judge and court personnel, 'horizontal' feedback from
judges' peers on the district court, and 'downward' feedback from appellate judges").
253. The Federal Judicial Center has the expertise to administer such surveys. See,
e.g., Lee & Willging, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 35-36.
254. For similar examples of public perception, see Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan
M. Singer, Using JudicialPerformance Evaluations to Promote JudicialAccountability,
90 JUDICATURE 200, 207 (2007) (noting that the dissemination of judicial performance
evaluations "enhances public trust and confidence").
255. At present, the U.S. courts do not collect contact information (i.e., e-mail, phone
numbers) for parties who are represented by counsel. The present proposal would require
an adjustment of this policy so that surveys could be administered to all members of the
public who appear as parties in filed cases. A similar recommendation has been made,
albeit for the purpose of performance evaluation of judges. See generally Rebecca Love
Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for the Federal
Judiciary, 86 DENv. U. L. REv. 7 (2008). The present recommendation is related, but has
a different purpose: the surveys would primarily serve as a means to evaluate the
COURT REv.
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interactive experiences with district court judges, magistrate judges,
other court officials,256 lawyers, and opposing parties.257 Next, the
survey would assess their experience of distributive justice, including the
extent to which the legal outcome is fair and legitimate.258 The survey
would include an evaluation of each party's satisfaction with case
management, the cost and time associated with civil justice, and the final
resolution. By way of example, Donna Stienstra and Professors Nancy
Welsh and Bobbi McAdoo have developed an excellent survey
instrument that examines judicial practices in settlement sessions.259
Moreover, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has designed
and made available a tool that measures experiences of access and
fairness, which state courts use for annual assessments.260
These dimensions of justice-procedural and distributiveincorporated into the human-centered surveys converge to shape a more
fundamental andsholistic experience of justice. These justice questions
would be tested, validated, and shown to be psychologically and
physiologically meaningful 26 1-survey
responses which reflect
effectiveness of the civil justice system in realizing experiences of justice. Cf Kevin S.
Burke, A Court and a Judiciary that Is as Good as Its Promise, 40 COURT REV. 4, 6
(2003), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr4l-2/CR41-2Burke.pdf.\
256. See Tina Nabatchi, Lisa Blomren Bingham & David H. Good, Organizational
Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six-Factor Model, 18 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT.
148, 152 (suggesting that surveys of interactions with mediators would provide a fuller
picture of parties' experiences) (2007).
257. See id. at 152-53 (noting that earlier studies were failures for not capturing
interactions with opposing parties and calling for a separate focus on disputant-disputant
relations).
258. See generally Hegtvedt & Cook, supra note 135.
259. See Nancy Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo, The Application of
ProceduralJustice Research to JudicialActions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions,
in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE:

COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 73-78

(Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013); see also Nancy Welsh, MagistrateJudges,
Settlement, and ProceduralJustice (Feb. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
260. See Trial Court PerformanceMeasures, COURTOOLS, http://www.courtools.org/
Trial-Court-Performance-Measures.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); Douglas Denton,
Procedural Fairness in the Cahfornia Courts, 44 COURT REV. 44, 51-52 (2007),
http://www.proceduralfaimess.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/
proceduralfaimess/Denten.ashx; David B Rottman, Trust and Confidence in the Calfornia Courts:
A Survey of the Public and Attorneys, Part I: Findings and Recommendations, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (2005), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrustl.pdf;

Steve Leben, Considering Procedural-FairnessConcepts in the Courts of Utah,
PROCEDURALFAIRNESS.ORG (2011), http://www.proceduralfairness.org/Resources/~/media

/Microsites/Files/proceduralfairness/Utah%20Courts%20and%20Procedural%2OFairness
%2009-2011 .ashx. See also RSI/ABA Model Mediation Surveys, RESOLUTION SYSS.
INST., http://www.aboutrsi.org/publications.php?slD=12.
261. See generally Eliot Smith, Research Design, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 27 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M.

Judd eds., 2000).
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experiences of injustice would correlate with stress responses reflected
on galvanic skin responses, EEG, and cardiovascular activity. Finally,
while these surveys would measure the experiences of parties after cases
close on the CM-ECF docket, in appropriate instances civil justice
designers should also measure the experiences of non-party members of
the public. These impartial members of the public are stakeholders who
may have prior contact with the civil justice system and will have an
interest in the future of the civil justice system.2 62
Under this proposal, lawyers and judges would also receive an
anonymous online survey when each case closes. The lawyers' survey
would collect basic information and essential information about the
dispute and stakes. Lawyers would rate their experience of justice and
satisfaction on the same dimensions as parties: case management, cost,
time, and final dispute resolution. Lawyers would. then rate the
cooperation and professionalism of opposing counsel, and the
professionalism of the judge.263 Moreover, the survey would assess the
cost and time actually expended, much like the FJC's case-specific
survey prepared for the Advisory Committee.2 64 On the judges' survey,
each judge would be asked to rate his or her perception of the justice
experienced by the parties (i.e., procedural and distributive justice).
Judges would rate the lawyers' professionalism and indicate their
satisfaction with case management and the time associated with
managing the case. On an aggregate and anonymous basis, the FJC
could make this survey data available to rulemakers, court
administrators, legal scholars, and the public.

&

262. See discussion, supra note 84 (citing AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE at 4446).
263. While this proposal entails case-specific surveys, several scholars have proposed
annual performance evaluations of federal judges by lawyers. See, e.g., Kourlis
Singer, supra note 255, at, 202; Todd. D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
JudicialPower in the Era of ManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 105-113
(1995); Kessler, supra note 236, at 689. Moreover, several state courts have regular
evaluations, albeit as part of their performance review programs. See, e.g., Judicial
Performance Review,

HAW.

STATE

http:www.courts.state.hi.us/courts/

JUDICIARY,

performance review/judicialperformancereview.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2017); see,
e.g.,

Performance

Evaluations

1996-Present,

ALASKA

JUDICIAL

COUNCIL,

http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/rethist.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2017); see also AM.
BAR

Ass'N

GUIDELINES

FOR THE EVALUATION

OF

JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

WITH

COMMENTARY app. T (2005) http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publicatio
ns/judicial division/aba blackletterguidelinesjpewcom.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Mar. 23, 2017).
264. See Lee & Willging, Case-BasedCivil Rules Survey, supra note 156, at 35-36.
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Table 2 - Human-Centered Surveys of Parties, Lawyers, and Judges
Parties
Case Information
Party identified
Opposing party identified
Lawyers identified
Judge identified

Lawyers
Case Information
Party identified
Opposing party identified
Lawyers identified
Judge identified

Judge
Case Information
Parties identified
Lawyers identified
Judge identified
* Demographic

*

*
*

Demographic
information of party
represented
CM-ECF docket
category

* Demographic
information of party
represented
* CM-ECF docket category
* CM-ECF docket sheet

CM-ECF docket sheet

* Final procedure

* CM-ECF docket

* Final disposition

category
* CM-ECF docket sheet

* Stakes of dispute

* Final procedure

Final procedure
* Final disposition
*

* Approximate cost
charged

information of party
represented (if listed
case is a federal civil
rights matter and
available)

* Final disposition

* Approximate hours

expended

Procedural Justice
Parties rate their experience
of procedural justice:
*

Overall fairness of
process
1) Fairness of formal
procedures
2) Fairness of case

Procedural Justice
Lawyers rate their experience
of procedural justice:
Overall fairness of
process
1) Fairness of formal
procedures
2) Fairness of case

management

3)

Ratings on quality
of party

* Court personnel

management

2)

of party

Judge
Court personnel

* Opposing counsel (e.g.,

Opposing counsel
" Opposing parties

cooperation,
professionalism)

Fairness of case

management
3) Ratings on quality

with:
*
*

* Party's counsel
*

Overall fairness of
process
1) Fairness of formal
procedures

3) Ratings on quality of
lawyer interactions

interactions with:
* Judge

Procedural Justice
Judges rate each party's
experience of procedural
justice:

*

interactions wit:
Judge

* Court personnel
* Opposing counsel
(e.g., professionalism).

Distributive Justice

Distributive Justice

Distributive Justice

Parties rate their experience
of distributive justice:

Lawyers rate their experience
of distributive justice:

Judges rate each party's
experience of distributive
justice:

Overall fairness of
dispute resolution
1) Fairness of
outcome
2) Outcome
satisfaction

Overall fairness of
dispute resolution
1) Fairness of outcome
2) Outcome satisfaction

fairness of
dispute resolution
1) Fairness of
outcome
2) Outcome

*Overall
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satisfaction
Overall satisfaction
Parties rate their overall
satisfaction with:
1) Process of dispute
resolution
2) Case management
3) Cost expended
4) Time to resolution

Overall satisfaction
Lawyers rate their overall
satisfaction with:
1) Process of dispute
resolution
2) Case management
3) Cost expended to resolve
dispute
4) Time to resolution of
dispute

Overall satisfaction
Judges rate their overall
satisfaction with:
1) Process of dispute
resolution
2) Case management
3) Cooperation and
professionalism of
counsel
4) Resources expended to
resolve dispute
5) Time expended to
resolve dispute

These human-centered surveys offer important benefits. As Judge
Kevin Burke, a leading proponent of procedural justice reform, has aptly
said, "what you measure is what you care about. For courts to build
public trust and enhance the legitimacy of judicial decision making, there
must be a willingness to commit to measuring procedural fairness." 6
To begin, these surveys would allow designers to more systematically
evaluate the experiences of the public when identifying problems within
2 66
The case-specific nature of the proposal offers
the civil justice system2.
a deeper assessment of diverse stakeholder experiences, revealing needs,
aspirations, and concerns in particular contexts. Impressionistic surveys
about general attitudes toward the civil justice system do none of this.
Surely the public and judges are stakeholders of the federal civil
justice system, yet neither was surveyed before the rulemaking process
culminating in the 2015 amendments. With the exception of the FJC '5
case-specific surveys, all other surveys gleaned only lawyers' general
impressions about the civil justice system. In contrast, these proposed
surveys, linked to CM-ECF dockets and particular cases, would allow an
assessment of the kind and magnitude of any civil justice problem, and
reveal the classes of cases in which the problem surfaces.
The case-specific nature of the proposed surveys would allow an
interlocking examination of the degree to which the perspectives and
265.

See Kevin S. Burke, A Vision for Enhancing Public Confidence in the Judiciavy,

95 JUDICATURE

251, 253

(2012), http://www.amjudges.org/conferences/2013Annual/

EducationMaterials/Burke-A-Vision-for-Enhancing-Public-Confidene-in-Judiiary.pdf
See also www.proceduralfairess.org (procedural fairness for judges and courts).
266. For similar surveys with exceptional results, see Kessler, supra note 236, at 688
(highlighting the advantages of upward, horizontal and downward feedback). This
system works in the business world, and it should work here as well. "[W]hat works
elsewhere will work for judges: providing judges with more information about how they
are performing their jobs is likely to help judges change their behavior in desirable
ways." Id.
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experiences of diverse stakeholders converge or diverge. Regarding
convergence, parties and lawyers would be asked to rate the extent to
which they experienced procedural and distributive justice, and judges
would be asked to rate the extent to which the parties experienced both
dimensions of justice. The surveys, therefore, would examine the
empathic accuracy of judges when predicting the public's experiences of
justice and the extent to which the justice evaluations of parties and their
lawyers converge or diverge.267
The surveys may also find potential convergence and divergence by
having judges rate the lawyers' professionalism and lawyers rate the
judge's professionalism and case management. These data would allow
for feedback and continual improvement of the civil justice system and
ensure that it is operating as theorized in an accountable, transparent
way. Above all, awareness that a wide swath of litigants experience a
particular rule or practice as unjust should prompt discussion of whether
an intervention, such as altering a procedural rule or process, is
warranted.26 8 Relatedly, if a wide swath of parties, lawyers, and judges
experience a particular rule or practice as just and fair, then this feedback
mechanism should serve as a cautionary note against engaging in
significant change.269
The second recommendation proposes iterations, pilots, and RCTs
before adoption and would examine the intended and unintended effects

267.

See WILLIAM

ICKES, EVERYDAY MIND READING: UNDERSTANDING WHAT OTHER

PEOPLE THINK AND FEEL 271-298 (2003); Anjali Krishnan et al., Somatic and Vicarious

Pain areRepresented by DissociableMultivariateBrain Patterns, ELIFE (June 14, 2016),
https://elifesciences.org/content/5/el5166; Christine Ma-Kellams & Jennifer Lerner,
Trust Your Gut or Think Carefully? Examining Whether an Intuitive, Versus a
Systematic, Mode of Thought Produces Greater Accuracy, 111 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 674, 675 (2016); Christopher Bergland, The New Science of Empathic
Accuracy Could Transform Society, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 23, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-way/201607/the-new-scienceempathic-accuracy-could-transform-society.
268. See generally SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 21-25, 26 ("The
contrast that is involved here is between seeing institutional reforms in terms of their role
in taking us toward transcendental justice (as outlined by Nagel), and assessing them in
terms of the improvement that such reforms actually bring about, particularly through the
elimination of what are seen as cases of manifest injustice (which is an integral part of the
approach presented in this book).").
269. Another variant for this proposal would be to survey stakeholders immediately
before a decision is reached in their case. That is, these surveys would examine the
dimensions of procedural and interactive justice ex ante before a substantive decision has
been reached. In this variation, the stakeholders' ratings of procedural justice and overall
satisfaction would not be influenced by the decision reached in the dispute. While this
variation may allow the purest assessment of their perspectives on the procedural
handling of the dispute, it would offer only a partial view of their experience with the
civil justice system.
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270

of that change on diverse stakeholder experiences.27 In this regard, the
2015 amendments were not empirically evaluated before adoption, nor
was it clear that the nature and extent of the problems being addressed by
these amendments (i.e., costs and delays) were sufficiently understood to
properly intervene through trans-substantive rulemaking, given the casespecific survey data revealing that these problems did not occur in the
vast majority of federal cases.271
In marked contrast, these human-centered surveys provide several
important dependent measures to compare treatment and control
conditions when conducting pilots and RCTs. Importantly, the effect of
any proposed change could be examined across diverse stakeholders on a
case-specific basis. For example, civil justice designers would have the
means to evaluate whether a proposed trans-substantive change resolves
the problem identified, without having deleterious effects in particular
classes of cases or among particular categories of litigants.272
The third recommendation calls for stakeholder experiences to be
closely monitored and evaluated after an amendment is enacted.273
Federal court administrators and officials should discern the operation
and effects of formal changes on the public's experiences when
encountering and navigating the federal civil justice system. This
systematic evaluation moves beyond impressionistic accounts of civil
justice toward an empirical, human-centered understanding of whether
and how recent designs affect the quality ofjustice.2 74
The movement toward human-centered rulemaking is preferable to
the current rulemaking process. Human-centered civil justice design is
vital because judges and court administrators are stewards of our
democracy, access to justice, and the rule of law-stewards who
safeguard the legitimacy of our civil justice system.275 The public's day-

270. See Part I.A.3. This proposal echoes back to a proposal advanced several
decades ago by one of the scholars who pioneered research on procedural justice. See
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, 51 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 83-84 (1988), http://scholarship.law.duke.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3967&context-lcp.
271. See supra Part II.A.
272. See Thomas & Price, supra note 243, at 1156-57; Rittel & Webber, supra note
82, at 165.
273. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 48, at 319-56; AMSLER ET AL., supra note 48, at
Chapter 4, System Design Practice ("Build a process for adjusting the design based upon
performance.").
274. See PHILIP SELZNICK, A HUMANIST SCIENCE 32 (Stanford Univ. Press 2008).
275. For several classics that speak to this lesson, see Lon L. Fuller and Kenneth I.
Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 367-69 (1978);
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos andNarrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739, 755-56 (1982).
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to-day interactions with judges and courthouse personnel shake or
strengthen the public's trust in courts and faith in democratic
institutions. 276 Some have lamented the unelected nature of federal
judges, deriding the federal judiciary as impaired by the countermajoritarian difficulty and a democratic deficit. 27 7

Human-centered design and surveys of stakeholders offer a middle
way-feedback for courts and officials to learn the perspective of
stakeholders, an evaluative tool that would increase the democratic
sensitivity of court officials to the experiences of those who encounter,
navigate, and experience the civil justice system. Illuminating a more
ecologically accurate depiction of how court users and stakeholders
experience the civil justice system in particular cases and including these
diverse voices, human-centered design offers a more participatory and
democratic form of deliberation in the rulemaking process and could be
engaged in a manner that would more effectively reconcile the plural
values that the system seeks to promote.27 8
Finally, the movement toward human-centered rulemaking reflects
a humble, incremental mind-set, one more likely to prevent and avoid
"wicked system problems."279 For example, when problems are illdefined or poorly understood, proposed solutions fail to grasp the nature
of causes, conditions, and linked web of systems involved. As such,
these solutions may exacerbate the problem or create a host of more
severe problems. By being human-centered, empathizing with the
perspectives of diverse stakeholders, iterating with pilots and RCTs, and
deliberately adopting mechanisms to learn, evaluate, and receive
feedback from court users and stakeholders, human-centered civil justice
designers foster a more effective, just, legitimate, resilient, and
sustainable civil justice system.

276.

See Burke, supra note 265, at 254.
277. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the CaseAgainst Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L. J. 1346 (2006); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-18 (2d
ed. 1986) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act ...

it

thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now . . . ."). See
also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE

COURTS (1999).
278. See Martha Minow & Joseph William Singer, In Favor of Foxes: Pluralism as

FactandAid to the PursuitofJustice, 80 B.U. L. REV. 903, 905-06 (2010).
279.
21.

See Rittel & Webber, supra note 82, at 155-69; Buchanan, supra note 82, at 20-
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Human-CenteredManagerialJudging

The recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require earlier and more active live, in-person case management. 280
Taken together, the amendments to Rule 1, Rule 16, and Rule 26(b)
enlarge the power of federal judges to engage in managerial judging.281
In his 2015 year-end report, Chief Justice Roberts extolled a
reengineered legal culture in which judges exercise this power earlier in
the process to guard against the cost of discovery and delays.282 This call
for a legal culture oriented toward efficient justice is in tension with
human-centered civil justice design. While federal judges should be
efficient when engaging in case management, their aim should include
ensuring that their interactions with the parties are infused with fairness
and procedural justice and that their pretrial decisions promote
experiences of justice.
Managerial judging, which describes the replacement of
dispassionate and impartial judging with a more active, managerial
stance,283 began first in the context of pretrial discovery and with the
need for an adjudicator to decide conflicts between parties who requested

280. See Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on the
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Re: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 2 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts. gov/sites/default/files/st09-2014add 0.pdf ("What is needed can be described in two words--cooperation and
proportionality-and one phrase-sustained,
active, hand-on judicial case
management."); United States Courts, Civil Rules 2015-Overview, YOuTUBE (Dec. 21,
2015), www.youtube.com/watch?v-lszO cr8xkRE; 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41;
see also E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986).
281. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules "should be construed, administered, and employed by
the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding") (emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) ("The district
judge . .. must issue a scheduling order: ... (B) after consulting with the parties'
attorneys and any unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference [by telephone, mail,
or other means] . . . (2) The judge must issue the scheduling order as soon as practicable,
but unless the judge finds good cause for delay, the judge must issue it within the earlier
of 90 days after any defendant has been served within the complaint or 60 days after any
defendant has appeared. . . (3)(B) The scheduling order may: (v) direct that before
movingfor an order relatingto discovery, the movant must request a conference with the
court") (emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case . . ."); see generally Rowe, supra note 243.
282. See supra Part II.B.
283. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982);
Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in GuidingA
Casefrom Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Steven S. Gensler, Judicial
Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DuKE L.J. 669 (2010).
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discovery and those who withheld discovery. 284 When engaging in
active case management, judges make pretrial decisions that affect the
course, timing, and scope of litigation 2 85 and the theories of liability and
defenses on which the plaintiff and defendant are able to collect evidence
during discovery.2 86 Judges also regularly meet with parties in chambers
to encourage settlement whether as negotiators, mediators, or planners.28 7
Judges engage in bureaucratic logics of efficiency, speed, cost, calendars,
and disposition statistics, with their decisions often being outcome
28
dispositive.
The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
an inflection point that heightens the powers of managerial judges,
requiring federal courts to engage in even earlier and more active case
management and emphasizing live, in-person meetings with the
parties. 2 89 Not only may courts now require parties to engage in a live,
in-person meeting with the judge before filing a motion in aid of
discovery, but Rule 26(b) now affirmatively defines the scope of
discovery with proportionality determinations and cost-benefit balancing,
meaning that in most disputes, judges will serve as active case managers
who define the scope of discovery with these cost-benefit considerations
in mind.2 90 Amended Rule 1 provides federal courts a new lever to
demand that the parties comply with the court in advancing the speedy
and inexpensive resolution of disputes. 29 1 Finally, in addition to this
enlarged power, federal judges have wide discretion when carrying out
their managerial role and interacting with parties and their lawyers. The
standards and norms that apply when engaging in this managerial role
are often highly subjective and ill-defined.292
284. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the FederalRulesAnd the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 191 (2007).
285. See Resnik, supra note 283, at 378; Gensler, supra note 283, at 671.
286. See Resnik, supra note 283, at 378; Gensler, supra note 283, at 671.
287. See Resnik, supra note 283, at 378; Gensler, supra note 283, at 671.
288. See Rowe, supra note 284, at 193-202.
289. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
290. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) ("Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
considering ... whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit."); 2015 Year-End Report, supra note 41, at 10 ("Judges must be willing to
take on a stewardship role, managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing
parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of litigation.").
291. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (Rules "should be. . . employed by the court and the
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.") (emphasis added).
292. See Resnik, supra note 283, at 426. For example, the Federal Courts Study
Committee noted that, "[t]here are no standards for making these 'managerial' decisions,
the judge is not required to provide a 'reasoned justification,' and there is no appellate
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Judith Resnik presciently cautioned against many of the hazards of
this managerial power in her now canonical article ManagerialJudges.29 3
As Resnik warned, case management affords judges greater power with
no circumscribing constraints.294 Active case management occurs out of
public view, off record, and judges are not obligated to offer written
decisions; 295 in addition, the ubiquity of settlements means interim
decisions are often unreviewable, as settlements are rarely appealable. In
its less pernicious form, prior decisions by judges in the pretrial process
296
In its more pernicious form,
may shape their later judgments.
managerial judging places district judges in frequent and close contact
with attorneys and parties, which may rouse strong feelings of liking or
disliking, and thus provoke biased decision-making..297
Despite these warnings, some legal scholars and jurists support
broad managerialism and advocate for even greater managerial powers
than the present rules of civil procedure allow. These writers agree that
today's judges need managerial powers in order to respond to the volume
and complexity of modern litigation.29 8 Steven Baicker-McKee argues
that the prevalence of settlements is justification for increasing
managerialism, as it allows judges to have a meaningful role in
review. Each judge is free to consult his or her own conception of the importance and
merit of a case and the proper speed with which it should be disposed. This, in turn,
promotes arbitrariness." Larry Kramer, Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee
on the Role of the Federal Courts and their Relationship to the States, 1 FED. COURTS
STUDY

COMM.,

WORKING

PAPERS

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE

REPORTS

1,

55

(1990),

&

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsflookup/ fcscvoll.pdf/$file/fcscvoll.pdf; see generally
Peterson, supranote 263.
293. See Resnik, supra note 283; Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and
Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REv. 611, 617-18 (2014) ("Rather than rely on
evidence of guilt in the individual case at hand, misdemeanor courts sort defendants
based largely upon records of prior encounters.").
294. See Resnik, supra note 283, at 378, 425.
295. See id.
296. See id at 426-31; Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN
LAW 43 (Harold J. Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971) ("[N]onadversarial systems are
objectionable because the decision-maker may reach a conclusion at an early stage
and . .. adhere to that conclusion in. the face of conflicting considerations later
developed."); see also Craig A. Anderson, Belief Perseverance, ENCYC. OF Soc.
PSYCHOL. (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds. 2007); RICHARD E. NISBETT
LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
(1980); Charles G. Lord, Less Ross & Mark R. Lepper, BiasedAssimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently ConsideredEvidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An
Examination of Factors That Aggravate and Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal
Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315 (2009).
297. See FEELEY, supra note 46, at 241-43; see Resnik, supra note 282, at 427.
298. See Steven Baicker-McKee, ReconceptualizingManagerialJudges, 65 AM. U. L.
REV. 353 (2015); see also Hon. D. Brooks Smith, The Managerial Judge and Y2K
Litigation, 18 REV. LITIG. 403 (1999).

802

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:3

promoting just, speedy, and inexpensive trials, and advocates for reform
that makes managerial powers mandatory rather than permissive.299
Researchers have pointed to non-class mass tort claims and other
complex cases as exemplars of the needs served by managerial
judging. 300 Alvin Hellerstein argues that without the proactive and
creative application of managerial powers early in cases, tort claims
brought by the 9/11 responders would have taken years to resolve and
may still be ongoing.301 Supporters of broad managerial authority argue
that Professor Resnick's criticisms are overstated and unrealistic, and, to
the extent that they are legitimate, can be cured by a variety of smaller
interventions.302
The Chief Justice's remarks are disconcerting as they complicate
this debate surrounding managerial judging. In the main, the Chief
Justice defines what judicious management will entail: efficient justice.
Yet when courts engage in managerial judging, they should ensure that
the public experiences dispute-handling procedures as fair and should
adopt practices that afford litigants respect and promote experiences of
justice. For example, as Judge Susan Gauvey has explained,303 judges
should consider both the medium and the message, with the aim of
treating all litigants with dignity and respect. While courts are unable to
control whether any given litigant will ultimately receive a favorable
decision, courts should nonetheless afford litigants with meaningful
process that makes dispute resolution less painful-meaningful process
that is experienced as just.
In this regard, Judge Kevin Burke and Judge Steven Leben of the
American Judges Association have crafted a white paper offering several
excellent recommendations. 304 In each case at bar, judges should explain
the process and their judicial orders in understandable language so that
litigants, witnesses, and jurors understand what to expect.30 s At the start
of the docket, moreover, judges can explain the ground rules-what will
299. Baicker-McKee, supra note 298.
300. See generally Alvin K. Hellerstein, et. al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11
Responders' Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 127 (2012); see also Barry R. Schaller,
ManagerialJudging: A PrincipledApproach to Complex Cases in State Court, 68 CONN.
B.J. 77 (1994).
301. Hellerstein, supra note 300, at 60-61.
302. See Baicker-McKee, supra note 298.
303. See Hon. Susan K. Gauvey, DeliveringJustice The Medium Is the Message Too,
40 ABA LITIG. J. 2 (2014).
304. See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, ProceduralFairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, 44 COURT REv. 4, 22-25 (2007), http://proceduralfairness.org
/-/media/Microsites/Files/procedural-fairness/CR44-1-2.ashx;see also Denton, supra
note 259, at 47-48 (incorporating copy of Conference of State Court Administrators'
Resolution 6 "In Support of AJA White Paper on Procedural Fairness" passed in 2008).
305. See Burke & Leben, supra note 304, at 20.
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happen, why certain cases will be heard first, why litigants or defendants
may be limited in what they can say in time or scope-and the need for
and significance of the procedures used.306 Finally, judges should engage
in active listening, and do their utmost to truly consider all sides and to
signal that they are considering each side's point of view.307 Humanizing
the process in these ways will diminish experiences of injustice by
ensuring that parties feel the judicial forum is neutral and trustworthy,
one that treats them with dignity and respect. If neglected, these
experiences may diminish the perceived effectiveness of the civil justice
system and undermine the aim of effectuating rights and delivering
compensatory justice.
These practices nourish the federal judges who engage in case
management themselves. When managerial judges afford parties with
dignified and respectful treatment, they will be more inclined to believe
that promoting human dignity and human worth are important values of
the civil justice system. The more managerial judges provide procedural
justice and interactional justice to all members of society, the more they
will regard all social groups as truly belonging to our democratic society.
As explained when elaborating on the primacy of behavior on attitudes,
civil justice designers must be cautious about requiring legal officials to
act consistent with bureaucratic logics of efficient justice that deny
experiences of justice, as this behavior will enervate and erode beliefs
about the value of human worth and human dignity.
CONCLUSION

We began with three illustrations of human-centered design
thinking.
In the first, designers created an innovative program
collaborating with a hospital to discover hundreds of opportunities to
better reconcile medical and efficiency concerns with empathy for
patient perspectives and experiences. 30 8 The second resulted in a
messaging campaign celebrating everyday moments as learning
opportunities that strengthen the foundation of a child's brain
development and later formed the foundation of a successful publichealth campaign. 3 09 In the third, human-centered designers developed an
online program for legal-aid providers to reclassify nonviolent felonies
into misdemeanors, thereby eradicating a previously unaddressed legal
barrier with major health, social, and financial consequences on people's

306.
307.

See id.
See Nancy Welsh et al., supra note 259, at 73-78.

308.
309.

See BROWN & KATZ, CHANGE BY DESIGN, supra note 1, at 155-77.
See IDEO, FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN, supra note 5, at 71-73.
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In each of these examples, human-centered
day-to-day lives.3 10
designers addressed seemingly intractable social problems by
empathizing with stakeholder communities, deeply understanding those
served, and partnering with these communities to design solutions rooted
in people's actual needs, aspirations, and concerns.
This Article drew on insights and lessons in both human-centered
design thinking and dispute system design to synthesize a novel
approach, human-centered civil justice design. Human-centered civil
justice design begins with empathizing with intended beneficiaries,
stakeholders, and court users to uncover their needs and experiences with
interviews, observation, immersion, and other forms of perspective
taking. Civil justice designers ideate and brainstorm a range of desirable
options before winnowing them based upon feasibility and financial
viability. Pilots and prototypes are harnessed to gather insight from
stakeholders about the causes, conditions, and nature of problems.
Human-centered designers aspire to empirically test these pilots with
RCTs to explore the intended and unintended system-wide effects of any
intervention. The public's needs, aspirations, concerns, and experiences
ofjustice are the root of human-centered civil justice design.
The Article introduced a form of human-centered civil procedure
rulemaking that seeks to infuse the rulemaking process with a vision in
which diverse stakeholders and court users experience the civil justice
system as truly just. The approach is predicated on the. experiences of
members of the public who encounter and navigate through the civil
justice system. Three recommendations were proposed: (1) stakeholder
experiences of justice (i.e., procedural and distributive) should be
systematically evaluated when cases close on the federal docket; (2) civil
justice designers should conduct pilots and RCTs to examine the impact
of rule changes on stakeholder experiences of justice before adopting
significant changes; and (3) civil justice designers should empirically
monitor how changes to the civil justice system affect stakeholder
experiences of justice as a feedback mechanism.
The Article, also discussed the recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which chart a new course in the ongoing civil
justice experiment with managerial judging. In this new course, rather
than prioritizing efficient justice and neglecting more capacious forms of
justice, federal judges should harness psychological science on justice to
promote the plural ends of the civil justice system. Managerial judges
should consider the many advantages of a procedurally just system,
while at the same time considering the sundry disadvantages of a
procedurally unjust system when navigating ways of realizing cost and
310.

See Latimer, supra note 12, at 15.
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time efficiencies. Judges must be vigilant about the quality of their
managerial judging, not simply the quantity or speed of cases processed.
This human-centered approach to managerial judging is deeply
consistent with the ends of a flourishing democracy and with the ethos
and ethics of the many federal judges who aspire to treat all members of
the public with dignity and respect and who believe in delivering
meaningful access to justice.
In closing, the human-centered design movement has inspired
hundreds of members of the public to give freely of their time, energy,
skills, and insights to find ways to improve federal, state, and local
government. 3 11 This energy directed toward the common good-and the
human-centered ethos that imbues the movement's innovations-holds
the promise of catalyzing a new era of civil justice design. In this era,
civil justice design will truly empathize with the beneficiaries and users
of the civil justice system, seeking to learn their needs and potentiality,
and to understand their perspectives. In this era, we will aspire to
promote human dignity and human fulfillment and to design the
continual growth, justness, and achievement of our democratic
institutions.
As an epilogue, when I first began this Article, human-centered
civil justice design represented theory. While writing this article, I
successfully taught two hundred 1L law students how to put into practice
human-centered design to promote access to justice. The curriculum was
designed to help law students understand the values that guide our
profession, including a commitment to the rule of law, access to justice,
and public service, and to put into practice empathy for those affected by
the civil justice system. They learned the perspective of affected
members of the community and were matched with legal-aid. partners,

311.

For example, "Hackathons," or social coding events, that have traditionally

focused on bringing together tech innovators to use tech design to solve business-related
problems, are now proliferating into the legal sector with a focus on improving how
people experience the civil justice system. For example, the University of Seattle School
of Law hosted the first "Social Justice" hackathon event in November, 2015. Law School
Hosts Social Justice Hackathon to Bridge Services Gap, SEATTLE U. SCH. OF L. (Oct. 22,

2015),
https://law.seattleu.edu/newsroom/2015-news/law-school-hosts-social-justicehackathon-to-bridge-services-gap. Today, A2J Hackathons are proliferating around the
country. See generally Allen Rodriguez, Legal Hackathons: Innovation Labs for the
Legal Industry, L. TECH. TODAY (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/

2015/10/legal-hackathons-innovation-labs-for-the-legal-industry. On a national level, the
Legal Services Corporation held a summit in 2013 on how to utilize technology to
increase access-to-justice for low-income households. LSC subsequently prepared a
report identifying five components for using technology to meet these needs. See Heidi
Alexander, Hackacess to Justice: ABA Journal's Hackathon Competition Comes to
Boston, L. TECH. TODAY (July 10, 2014), http://www.lawtech nologytoday.org/2014/07/
hackcess-to-justice-aba-joumals-hackathon-competition-comes-to-boston/.
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including Indiana Legal Services, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Neighborhood Christian Legal Clinic, and
the Indianapolis Legal Aid Society. Students met and worked with their
community partners to help deliver legal services more effectively by
creating human-centered access-to-justice innovations. These students
found the access-to-justice service-learning projects deeply rewarding.
These 1L students grew not only as individuals, but working together in
teams, they grew as future members of the legal profession.31 Their
collective efforts are revitalizing access to justice in Indiana; having a
ripple effect for people with unmet legal needs, stakeholders, and civil
society across our community; and revealing the promise and potential of
a human-centered approach to civil justice design.

312. Human-centered design thinking has taken root within the law school
curriculum. Across the country and in law schools abroad, law-student teams are
working with stakeholders to develop legal apps, websites, help desks, and other accessto-justice programs. See Tanina Rostain, Roger Skalbeck & Levin G. Mucahy, Thinking
Like a Lawyer, Designing Like an Architect: Preparing Students for the 21' Century
Practice, 88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 743 (2013) ("Among legal service providers, apps to
increase access to justice hold great promise . .. Legal access apps, which straddle the
line between published information and individual representation, have the potential to
help people who cannot afford representation to solve a broad range of legal problems.");
Dan Jackson, Human-CenteredLegal Tech: IntegratingDesign in Legal Education, 50 L.
TEACHER 92 (2016) ("As the legal profession begins in earnest to deploy digital
technology in service and information delivery, greater number of law schools are
including technology instruction in their curricula."); PAUL MAHARG, TRANSFORMING
LEGAL EDUCATION: LEARNING AND TEACHING THE LAW IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY 88 (2007) ("[T]he curriculum must be more in terms of the human relations

&

dealt with and less, as largely now, in terms of the logical concepts of the conventionally
trained legal mind." quoting Herman Oliphant memo to Dean Harlan F. Stone
commenting on the work of the American Law Institute). See, e.g., Commission on the
Future of Legal Services, AM. BAR Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/centers
(last visited Mar. 24,
commissions/commission-on-the-future-of-legal-services.html
2017); Margaret Hagan, Design Thinking and Law: A Perfect Match, L. PRACTICE
TODAY (Jan. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law
practice today home/lpt-archives/2014/januaryl4/design-thinking-and-law.html;
Latimer, supra note 12; Tina Rosenberg, Legal Aid With a Digital Twist, N.Y. TIMES,
CourtBot, CODE FOR AMERICA,
June 1, 2016, http://nyti.ms/1RLMW8t;
https://www.codeforamerica.org/ products/court-bot (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) ("Court
Bot gives residents easy-to-understand information about resolving citations and timely
reminders about upcoming court dates."); NULAwLAB, http://www.nulawlab.org (last
visited Mar. 24, 2017); Legal Innovation Lab, GENSLER, https://www.gensler.com/
research-insight/research/legal-innovation-lab (last visited Mar. 24, 2017); LEGAL DESIGN
JAM, http://legaldesignjam.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017); CYLAB USABLE PRIVACY
SEC. LAB, http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). One day, these future
lawyers will draw upon these skills to improve the civil justice system.

